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ABSTRACT
In the latter half of the twentieth century, subsidized housing created a system of
religious and racial segregation in the cities of Derry, Northern Ireland and South Boston,
Massachusetts. In the following thesis, the housing projects of the Creggan Estates in
Derry and the housing projects Old Colony and Old Harbor in South Boston will be the
case studies for identifying the historical similarities between these two cities. By
examining how the respective governments in each country used housing to achieve said
segregation, it will help to identify why in the latter half of the twentieth century, Irish
American Catholics fought against the African American Civil Rights Movement, while
their Irish Catholic counterparts in Derry fought for their own civil rights.
The examination of official government documents is used to investigate how top
officials viewed the Catholic areas in both cities. By uncovering if religion played a part
in Protestant lawmakers reactions to housing shortages in Catholic neighborhoods,
historians will be able to better understand why Protestant lawmakers seemingly chose to
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continue an antagonistic relationship between the Protestant and the Catholic
communities. In Derry, housing projects served to reinforce the political imbalance
between Catholics and Protestants. In Boston, low income Irish American Catholics were
separated from African Americans of the same or lower income level in Roxbury and
Jamaica Plain in the hopes that by separating the two groups, racial tensions would
dissipate. Not only did these projects work to separate certain demographics of the
population from one another, it created a sense of “us versus them,” which was one of the
factors in these cities’ different reactions to civil rights issues in the 1960s and 1970s.
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Introduction
On 4 October 1968 one of the headlines on the Evening Herald (Dublin)
proclaimed “Groups to Defy Ban on Derry Parade.”1 The following evening on 5 October
one headline dominated the same paper: “Marchers Cry ‘Gestapo.’” A sub-headline
reported, “Civil Right marchers in Derry clashed with police at the Craigavon Bridge end
of Duke Street this afternoon when they tried to break through a barrier of police vans
and R.U.C. men with arms linked.”2 The event that had prompted the Evening Herald to
print such a bold headline would prove to be one of the most transformative events the
province of Northern Ireland had ever experienced. On that dreary Saturday afternoon on
5 October, Irish Catholics in the small town of Derry (or Londonderry according to
some), Northern Ireland had taken to the streets to protest the discriminatory practices of
the Protestant ruling majority in the allocation of subsidized housing.
Since the 1920s Catholics in Derry had been subjected to building delays,
substandard living conditions, and overcrowding in their communities. Although this was
not a problem exclusive to Derry, because housing for the Catholic population was tied to
their political representation, they had grown weary of being denied their political rights.
The Protestant half of Northern Ireland’s population had never possessed a cordial
relationship with Irish Catholics, so when the state of Northern Ireland was created in
1920, in an attempt to consolidate its control of the North, they had used housing as a
means to keep Catholics from gaining any political power. In 1968, Irish Catholics
decided they had had enough, and so took to the streets to march for their long-denied

“Groups to Defy Ban on Derry Parade,” Evening Herald (Dublin), 4 October 1968, p. 1, Irish Newspaper
Archive.
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civil rights. Little did they know that this march would cause Northern Ireland to descend
into nearly thirty years of civil war, an era referred to as the “Troubles.”
A few years later, and nearly 3,000 miles away, tucked away on page seventeen,
the Boston Globe reported on 30 March 1974, “Boston Neighborhoods Get Ready for
March.”3 Six months later, on 30 September, this time on page eight, the Globe reported,
“400–700 March in S. Boston Against Busing.”4 The events which had spurred both of
these headlines would also prove to be transformative for the community of South
Boston, Massachusetts. However, where the residents of Derry had marched for their
civil rights, the residents of South Boston were marching in opposition to a policy
inspired by the African American Civil Rights Movement. Irish Catholics in South
Boston had taken to the streets in the humid summer months of 1974 to protest the local
government’s decision that South Boston High would participate in a busing program in
order to racially balance the high school.
In 1974 the District Court for Massachusetts had found that the Boston School
Committee had deliberately maintained segregation in Boston’s public-school system.
Boston’s lawmakers felt that the best way to rectify the situation was to have South
Boston High, which was a majority white and Irish American, and Roxbury High School,
a majority African America school, participate in a busing program. The residents of
South Boston declared they would not comply and started marching in protest to the
order. They claimed that they were not against the civil rights of African Americans, but
rather resented being told what to do by lawmakers who knew nothing about their

“Boston Neighborhoods Get Ready for March,” Boston Globe, 30 March 1974, p. 17, Boston Globe
Archive.
4
“400–700 March in S. Boston Against Busing,” Boston Globe, 30 September 1974, p. 8, Boston Globe
Archive.
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neighborhood, which to a certain extent was true. South Boston was a world unto itself,
defined by its strong Irish history. Historically, the neighborhood had never shared a
cordial relationship with the wealthy, ruling Protestant half of Boston’s population. When
the busing order was handed down, the residents of South Boston felt that this was just
another instance of Boston’s Protestants exerting their control over the Irish
neighborhood. The ensuing brief but violent years of protest came to be known as the
South Boston Busing Crisis.
The decades of chaos in Northern Ireland known as the Troubles (1968–1998) and
the years of upheaval witnessed during the South Boston Busing Crisis (1974–1988),
would change and shape both communities in profound ways. Although one was more
extreme than the other in terms of its length and scale of violence, both periods were no
less devastating or disruptive in their respective cities. Demonstrations spilled over into
full-scale riots. Stones, molotov cocktails, and petrol bombs were thrown at passing
vehicles, police, and those considered to be on the “other” side. Tensions escalated to the
point that young and old alike would suffer great bodily harm, and in some case, would
lose their lives. Both cities were marked by these periods of violence, left to deal with the
aftermath and consequences well into the twenty-first century. What set these movements
apart was that in Derry, Irish Catholics fought for their civil rights, long denied them by
the ruling Protestant community of Northern Ireland. In South Boston, Irish American
Catholics worked against the civil rights of African Americans, claiming that their own
rights were being denied in the city of Boston’s attempt to desegregate its public-school
system.
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However, the history of these two cities suggests that they had the potential to
have similar reactions to civil rights issues when they came to the fore in the latter half of
the twentieth-century. Both cities were founded, expanded, and controlled for generations
by a Protestant ruling class.5 Both had large populations of Irish Catholics with which
they had to contend, making sectarianism a defining feature of both city’s political
thought and practices. This, in turn, caused the identities of the Irish Catholics in both
cities to evolve in a similar manner. Influenced by a centuries-old antagonism with those
of the Protestant faith, each area defined itself by cultivating a heritage based on a
strongly republican ideal of Irishness.6 During the twentieth century, housing projects
built with the intent of providing low-income individuals and families an affordable
option to live in morphed into segregated slums, extreme poverty, and in some, cases
crime. The economy of Derry was similar enough to Boston that Irish Catholics separated
by 3,000 miles had many similar complaints against their respective governments for
failing to provide job opportunities which would have revitalized both cities. Both were
inhabited by heavily unemployed and working-class Irish Catholics, who by the late
1960s to early 1970s, were mistrustful of outsiders and preferred to care to their
neighborhoods themselves.7 These similarities, along with a few of others, pointed to the

5

For a complete history of Boston’s early history, see Thomas H. O’Connor, The Hub: Boston Past and
Present (Boston, Mass.: Northeastern University Press, 2001), esp. chaps. 1–5. For a complete history of
Northern Ireland’s early history, see Richard Killeen, A Brief History of Ireland: Land, People, History
(London: Constable and Robinson, 2012), esp. chaps. 8–11.
6
For a first-hand account of Derry’s Irishness, see Eamonn McCann, War and an Irish Town, 3rd. ed.
(London: Pluto Press, 1993). For a secondary analysis, see Niall Ó Dochartaigh, From Civil Rights to
Armalites: Derry and the Birth of the Irish Troubles (Cork, Ire.: Cork University Press, 1997). For a firsthand account of South Boston’s Irishness, see Michael Patrick MacDonald, All Souls: A Family Story from
Southie (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1999). For a secondary analysis, see Thomas H. O’Connor, South
Boston, My Home Town: The History of an Ethnic Neighborhood (1988, repre.; Boston, Mass.:
Northeastern University Press, 1994).
7
For Derry’s economy and unemployment rates during the twentieth century, see Ó Dochartaigh, From
Civil Rights to Armalites; and Robert Fist, In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster, and the Price of Neutrality,
1939–45 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1983). For South Boston’s economy and unemployment rates during
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potential that Irish Catholics in both Derry and South Boston should have had similar
reactions to the equality movements that sparked in the latter half of the twentieth
century. They both knew what it was to be discriminated against on the basis of ethnicity
and religion. However, their histories took radically different paths in the 1960s and
1970s, elevating the profile of the Catholic community in Derry and leaving a black spot
on the Irish Americans of South Boston.
In the case of housing, Derry and South Boston share many similarities. By
comparing the housing situation in Derry, Northern Ireland to that of South Boston,
Massachusetts, from 1920 to 1960 it will be possible to show that South Boston’s
reaction to the busing order was influenced by more than just racism. The failure of
Boston’s government to address the severe housing shortage and overcrowding in ethnic
areas like South Boston contributed to the frustration felt by the community’s residents,
much like the case of Derry. By examining the years leading up to the movements in each
area, it will be possible to expand the dialogue as to why the Irish American community
in South Boston fought against the desegregation of its high school in 1974.
Of the many challenges facing the post-World War II world, housing was one of
the most transformative. Although many big cities after World War II featured structural
decay and outdated infrastructure, housing was one of the more pressing issues facing
urban centers by the mid-1950s. Working class neighborhoods, often defined by their
extensive tenements for these often-unskilled laborers, had sprung up across Europe and
in America during the nineteenth century in response to the industrial boom. In the
aftermath of World War II, the need for updated buildings, better living conditions, and

the twentieth century, see O’Connor, The Hub; and Roland P. Formisano, Boston Against Busing: Race,
Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).
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subsidized housing for poor and working-class citizens became central topics of
conversation. Derry and South Boston were no exceptions to this, and proved to be the
areas most in need of better housing conditions for their residents. Urban renewal became
the vehicle by which these areas were “updated.” Such updates often translated into
displacing hundreds of low-income people, as was seen in the case of Boston, who then
could not afford the new structures built in place of the old tenements buildings. In the
case of Derry, new housing projects only served to perpetuate overcrowding rather than
alleviate it. However, although urban renewal would be the means by which cities like
Boston would rejuvenate their infrastructure, particularly in the case of Derry and South
Boston, this would eventually lead to more problems than it would initially solve.
In Derry, housing was tied to political representation, making it one of the most
contentious issues in the province of Ulster.* In South Boston, it was a marker of “turf,”
an indication of where one ethnic neighborhood began and the other ended. It was also a
means by which those Protestants in positions of power in each city were able to make
their feelings known about their respective Catholic communities. From 1920 to roughly
1960 both areas endured a severe housing shortage, one that shaped their political thought
and was one of the driving forces in their reactions to the issues of civil rights issues in
the 1960s and 1970s.
In Derry from the 1920s to 1930s, new housing developments were delayed and
canceled due to fears of upsetting the balance of Protestant control. Protestants in
Northern Ireland had, among other things, redrawn the electoral boundary lines of the
North’s urban centers, a practice known as gerrymandering, in order to assure that their

“Ulster” and “Northern Ireland” are considered interchangeable terms for this region. This paper will
follow this practice.
*
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political party, the Unionist Party, retained the upper hand in Ulster’s parliament, known
as Stormont. In doing this, they were able to keep Catholic political parties at bay. When
in the 1940s subsidized housing became a U.K.-wide program intended to alleviate
overcrowding, the allocation of those houses became another way in which the Unionist
Party was able to exude control over political power in the North. Catholics could not
receive too many new homes or the gerrymandered electoral lines and would be thrown
off. By containing the Catholic population to a specific area, the Unionist Party was able
to limit their political influence.
In Boston delaying, canceling, or channeling housing developments away from
ethnic neighborhoods like South Boston served as a means of reprisal for the Irish
Catholic community’s support of the Democratic Party. The Protestant population of
Boston had historically supported the Republican Party. The Irish, resentful of the
“Yankee’” conservative spending habits, unerringly supported the Democratic Party.
Unrestricted in their voting rights as were their counterparts in Derry, the Irish of Boston
ensured that one of their own was elected to the deeply coveted position of mayor. In the
1920s and 1930s, an Irish Catholic with the means to run an election campaign meant that
he was more than likely one of the infamous ward bosses. When in office they ran the
city as they did their wards, with extensive job contracts, favors extended to loyal
supporters, and under the table financial deals that always benefited them. When the
Protestant Yankees were able to regain control of the city, they often expressed their
displeasure of the Irish Catholic community’s choice of a mayor by failing to address
their housing shortage.
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In South Boston, this would have unfortunate side effects, which would prove to
be a double-edged sword. Although South Boston needed new housing developments,
they fought their construction because those in charge of the projects were often
Republicans. They continued to support corrupt Irish Democrats, which in turn made the
Republicans hesitant to see to the community’s needs. This unending cycle had severe
consequences for the housing issue, one that had long-lasting effects. An examination of
how religion and politics influenced housing developments in the twentieth century
between these two cities will help uncover why they dissolved so quickly into violence
when their respective governments made it clear they were not going to listen to their
demands or concerns during their respective movements.
Historiography
The historiography of housing in Derry and South Boston contains a dearth of
information on the early twentieth century. It is true that it was not until after World War
II that subsidized housing became a wide-reaching phenomenon, however, many histories
about Derry and Boston of the later twentieth century only discuss housing in terms of
how urban renewal changed these neighborhoods. Housing shortages, overcrowding, and
tenement buildings have not been discussed as issues going back to the 1920s but have
rather been shown to be problems of the late 1940s and 1950s. By demonstrating that
housing was actually a substantial issue in the early half of the century, historians will
better understand why these movements––the Troubles and the Busing Crisis––inspired
large social upheaval.
The few histories which discuss the South Boston Busing Crisis tend only
consider its political and racial aspects, and issues like housing have not yet been taken
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into consideration as one of the problems which caused the order to desegregate South
Boston High to be so explosive. Additionally, few historians have taken South Boston’s
Irishness into account when examining the history of the Busing Crisis. Currently the
only complete history on the Busing Crisis, Ronald Formisano’s Boston Against Busing:
Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s (1991), is incredibly thorough in its
examination in the economy of South Boston but does not offer an in-depth analysis on
the housing situation in either South Boston, or Roxbury, the African American
neighborhood paired with South Boston for the busing program. Formisano does
acknowledge that South Boston was predominantly Irish, but he fails to take the
neighborhood’s history and experiences into consideration. By not positioning South
Boston’s history in the Irish American experience, he does not fully identify why South
Boston reacted to the busing order in such a volatile way. Irish identity in South Boston
was linked to the Famine Irish of the nineteenth century and had, therefore, come from a
long tradition of poverty a resentment of governments defined by their Protestant
ascendancy. They were particularly distrustful of Boston’s Yankee Republican ruling
class, which is an aspect of South Boston’s history which must be taken into account
when looking at their violent reaction to the busing order.
One of the foremost authorities on Boston, Thomas H. O’Connor, has written
extensively on all aspects of Boston’s history and has shaped the current dialogue on the
religious dynamic between the Catholics and Protestants of the city. He has effectively
shown this relationship to be unique to the city of Boston and has utilized urban history
as a means of relating how the city’s development shaped Boston’s neighborhoods. He is
also one of the few historians to argue that South Boston’s Irishness was a contributing
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factor in 1974. All of his histories contain a political element, but The Boston Irish: A
Political History (1995) is an in-depth analysis of the antagonistic relationship between
the Irish Catholic Democrats and the Yankee Protestant Republicans. However, in his
more general histories of Boston, where he considers many different aspects of life in
Boston, he does link housing to Boston’s strained political situation. He, like many other
historians, considers housing only in its post-World War II aspects. His general history of
Boston, The Hub: Boston, Past and Present (2001), his urban history Building a New
Boston: Politics and Urban Renewal, 1950 to 1970 (1993), and his specific history South
Boston, My Home Town: The History of an Ethnic Neighborhood (1988), do not offer any
synthesized accounts of what housing was like from 1920 to 1950 in South Boston.
Although O’Connor is an invaluable source on Boston’s history, by conducting an indepth analysis of housing, and how it shaped South Boston, it will be possible to
construct a deeper understanding of South Boston’s attitude towards Boston’s local
government.
Other historians have also greatly enhanced our understanding of Boston’s past,
but here too there is a problem with how housing has been presented. Lawrence J. Vale
his history, From the Puritans to the Projects: Public Housing and Public Neighbors
(2000), is one of the only overviews of Boston’s history of housing. However, his biggest
shortcoming is that it does not discuss the housing shortage during the 1920s, but rather
goes from the late nineteenth century right to the mid-1930s when the New Deal was
introduced. Although this is a valuable addition to the scholarship, by passing over the
1920s and early 1930s, he has failed to explain why South Boston was in need of new
housing developments by 1950. He also does not discuss Boston’s ethnic makeup,
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beyond informing the reader that Boston had a large Irish population. Charles H. Trout in
Boston, the Great Depression, and the New Deal (1977) goes into greater detail of
Boston’s ethnic makeup, yet his discussion on housing is only to point out that it started
in the late 1930s. Finally, Gerard O’Neill’s Rogues and Redeemers: When Politics Was
King in Irish Boston (2012), is a collective biography of each of Boston’s Irish Catholic
mayors, linking to O’Connor’s history of the political history of Boston, but here too,
South Boston’s housing situation is not given a great deal of consideration. These
histories are informative and rich in their scholarship. However, by expanding these
histories to consider housing as an aspect of South Boston’s reaction to desegregation,
scholars will be able to present a more robust image of the Irish community in
Massachusetts.
The Troubles of Northern Ireland have been covered extensively by Irish and Irish
American historians for many years. When it comes to the issue of how housing inspired
the first civil rights march in Derry, the prevailing practice of the field is to start in 1968
with the formation of a group known as the Derry Housing Action Committee. Although
this was the first group to actually bring about relatively quick change to the housing
situation in the North, many historians have neglected to show that housing was, in
reality, a contentious issue from the moment Northern Ireland was created in 1920.
Expanding the history of Derry’s housing issue back to the 1920s will enhance the
scholarship of the Troubles and reveal how serious the situation was by the 1960s.
Of the many histories written on the Troubles, Niall Ó Dochartaigh is one of the
few Irish scholars to do a comprehensive history of Derry during the civil rights
movement. His history From Civil Rights to Armalites: Derry and the Birth of the Irish
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Troubles (1997), offers a detailed analysis of this city. But while he begins this history
with a brief summary of housing in the introduction, he too begins this history in 1968.
His article, “Housing and Conflict: Social Change and Collective Action in Derry in the
1960s,” (1999) is one of the only detailed histories of Derry housing situation, but even
here 1920 is mentioned only briefly, and his analysis starts in the late 1940s. One of the
more recent histories of the Troubles, Simon Prince’s Northern Ireland’s ‘68: Civil
Rights, Global Revolt and the Origins of The Troubles (2007), does a good job of linking
Northern Ireland to the Global 1968, and shows how Northern Ireland’s history
influenced the outbreak of the civil rights movement in 1968. Housing does play a key
role in this history, but Prince does not adequately explain that Ulster’s government was
dealing with housing shortages and overcrowding in the 1920s and that these were
directly impacted by the Unionist Party’s consolidation of political power. These
historians have greatly added to the knowledge of Northern Ireland’s Troubles, but they
do not adequately explain how housing was the issue that sparked the civil rights
movement.
Other general histories of the Troubles tend to have the same problem, as well as
presenting the idea that one of the parties which represented the Catholic community, the
Nationalist Party, was not participating in local government because of the Unionist
Party’s dominance throughout Northern Ireland. To a certain extent that is true, however,
they have failed to show that Nationalist ministers of parliament (MPs) were attempting
to force the Unionists to acknowledge that housing was a serious and destructive aspect
of life in Derry’s Catholic communities. David McKittrick and David McVea’s, Making
Sense of the Troubles: A History of The Northern Ireland Conflict (2012), Peter Rose’s
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How the Troubles Came to Northern Ireland (2001), and James Loughlin’s The Ulster
Question since 1945 (2004), all start their histories after World War II, and do point out
that housing shaped political thought and worked to divide the Protestant and Catholic
communities since the 1920s. This is just a sample of the many histories written on the
Troubles, but they are also some of the most widely used and discussed histories of the
field. By building on what these scholars have written about Northern Ireland and the
Troubles, this thesis will show why housing proved to be the spark that set Northern
Ireland alight.
Finally, this history is the first to compare the history of housing within these two
communities. There are currently two articles that link Boston to Derry, but neither
discuss housing in depth. The first is “‘Sure, It’s Hard to Keep Up with the Splits Here’:
Irish-American Responses to the Outbreak of the Conflict in Northern Ireland, 1968–
1974,” by Niall Ó Dochartaigh.8 This article details how Irish American groups in
Boston, like the Committee for Justice in Northern Ireland, worked with representatives
from Derry to influence the United States government to pressure Britain into intervening
in Ulster’s civil rights campaign. He also explains how Irish political groups had a
tendency to split and divide due to political differences, and how that influenced the
relationship between the Boston Irish and the Irish from Derry. The second is “Public
Protest and Popular Style: Resistance from the Right in Northern Ireland and South
Boston,” by Jack Santino.9 This article details why groups of the political right tend to

Niall Ó Dochartaigh, “‘Sure, It’s Hard to Keep Up with the Splits Here’: Irish-American Responses to the
Outbreak of the Conflict in Northern Ireland, 1968–1974,” Irish Political Studies 10, no. 1 (1995): 138–
160, https://doi.org/10.1080/07907189508406542.
9
Jack Santino, “Public Protest and Popular Style: Resistance from the Right in Northern Ireland and South
Boston,” American Anthropologist 101, no. 3 (September 1999): 515–528,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/683845.
8
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resist social movements that challenge the status quo. Although neither article will be
utilized in this thesis because they do not fit the time frame or the theme, these scholars
do show the merit in liking Derry’s history to South Boston’s. This paper will expand our
current understanding of housing between these two cities and why this issue was such a
transformative and controversial one in the 1960s and 1970s.
Sources
In terms of sources, this paper is largely a top-down analysis. In the case of Derry,
the parliamentary debates from both Westminster, the parliament of the United Kingdom,
and Stormont, the parliament of Northern Ireland, are used extensively. They show how
the members of parliament were reacting, and more often, turning a blind eye to the
situation of housing in Derry. They also divulge how often and forcefully Nationalist
MPs presented the case of substandard living conditions in Irish Catholics neighborhoods
in Derry. In order to gauge the reaction on the ground to this practice, newspapers from
various towns in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic are used to show what Irish
Catholics thought of their government, and its seeming refusal to address the housing
shortage and overcrowded conditions in Derry. Additionally, in order to show what the
top officials in Westminster though of the situation, Cabinet papers are used to reveal
what was said behind closed doors on the questionable practices of the Unionist
government.
Sources in South Boston offer somewhat of a challenge. Thomas O’Connor talks
in each of his histories how many official city documents were lost or deliberately
destroyed.10 Boston it seems is a city intent on keeping its secrets, however, this paper
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Thomas H. O’Connor, Building a New Boston: Politics and Urban Renewal, 1950 to 1970 (Boston,
Mass.: Northeastern University Press, 1993), xii–xiv.

14

has found many council city proceedings to draw upon in order to present a top-down
approach similar to the one used in the chapter on Derry. Although documentation at the
state level was not available at this time, due to none of these sources being digitized,
unlike the parliament debates for both Northern Ireland and Westminster, newspapers
from Boston have proven to be a rich source of information in relaying state and local
decisions when it came to the issue of housing. In order to gain the national perspective
when it proved necessary, Congressional debates proved useful in gaining an
understanding of how bills were implemented at the state level. Finally, various other
sources published by the City of Boston were a boon in understanding how the city
viewed itself and its citizens. Although the sources for Boston are more varied than those
for Derry, they have still worked to show how serious and long-lasting the effects of both
government’s failure to address housing problems were in the early and mid-twentieth
century.
***
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Chapter 1
Derry
Many histories of Northern Ireland’s Troubles speak of subsidized housing in
cities like Derry not becoming inflamed until the 1960s when social movements were
sparking around the world, and issues like civil liberties and equality were at the forefront
of university discussions. Although this is not an unfair assessment, it was in the years
directly preceding Northern Ireland’s inception in 1921 that laid the groundwork for
housing to become the issue which sparked the civil rights movement in Derry in 1968.
One of the principal actors of the Troubles, Bernadette Devlin, wrote in her memoir, The
Price of My Soul, “until [the] civil-rights campaign forced a promise of reform, housing
was the burning issue in Northern Ireland, because only householders have a vote in local
elections: subtenants, lodgers, and adult children living at home are all without the
vote.”11 Until the late 1960s, housing in Northern Ireland was the central political issue.
The Unionist leaders of Northern Ireland’s parliament, Stormont, desired to retain control
of political representation, and so manipulated housing development in the Catholic
majority neighborhoods in order to ensure they never gained the upper hand.
If the Nationalist cause ever gained enough political support through their sheer
volume of numbers, Unionists believed that the Nationalist party would challenge the
Union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Another key actor, Eamonn McCann
wrote in his memoir, War in an Irish Town, “to give a person a house . . . was to give him
a vote, and the Unionist Party in Derry had to be very circumspect about the people to
whom it gave votes.”12 From 1920 to the late 1960s, the Unionist Party worked to ensure

11
12

Bernadette Devlin, The Price of My Soul (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), 55.
McCann, War and an Irish Town, 79.

16

that their political domination remained weighted in their favor. By controlling housing
development in areas like Derry, Unionist hegemony in Ulster remained uninterrupted.
By the tactics of gerrymandering and delaying and canceling new building schemes,
Unionists retained their political control of Derry. Although such efforts did not become
wholly clear until after World War II, political decisions made by the Unionist Party from
the 1920s onward had far-reaching consequences for Catholic political rights.
Although it was in the 1920s that Protestants in the North started consolidating
their political power, they had been the ruling majority in the North for many decades
prior. Starting in the seventeenth century, the North of Ireland was colonized by
Presbyterians from Scotland at the behest of the British crown in an attempt to subjugate
the Catholic population. The British government felt that they needed loyal subjects to be
representatives of their authority in the region in order to better control the rebellious
native Irish. Protestant Scots were given land to settle in areas such as Derry which
quickly enabled them to become the economic and political rulers of the province.13
These Scots, whose Calvinism Westminster felt would prevent them from “going native,”
and assimilating into the Catholic population, ensured that loyal subjects governed Ulster,
willing to defend the crown’s rule of the province at whatever cost. This mentality shaped
the way Protestants in Ulster viewed themselves, as “a frontier community facing wily
and violent enemies,” which caused them to remain fiercely loyal to British authority.14
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The native Irish had been subjected to varying degrees of British control since the
thirteenth century. Britain first settled Dublin in the twelfth century, then expanded
outwards, slowly but surely bringing Ireland under their control through violence, legal
manipulation, and intimidation. The Irish, deeply resentful of their colonial overlords,
and the laws and regulations they were subjected to over the centuries, rebelled
frequently. In 1801 Britain decided to abolish Ireland’s parliament and unite the two
islands with the Act of Union, hoping that this would discourage any further rebellions.15
However, it only had the opposite effect, which caused Westminster to tighten its control
over the small country until the twentieth century. On Easter Monday in April of 1916
Irish republicans lead a small rebellion in Dublin which led to the Irish War of
Independence (1918–1920). Westminster, in an effort to pacify those Irish nationalists
who were demanding total independence from British rule, introduced the Government of
Ireland Act in 1920. Catholics in the Dublin and Protestants in Belfast would establish
their own parliaments, a practice called Home Rule, but the island would remain a
dominion within the British Empire.16
Dublin rejected the Act, and after three years of a guerrilla-style war, Britain
agreed to a cease-fire and independence talks in December of 1921 which gave birth to
the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Although the Treaty granted limited freedom for Southern
Ireland, the Protestant majority in six of the nine counties of the northern province of
Ulster (Atrium, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry/Derry, and Tyrone), rejected
it, fearing it would sever their ties to British authority. During the negotiations, James
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Craig, who later became the first prime minister of Northern Ireland, threatened Lloyd
George, the then prime minister of England, that Protestants in Ulster were willing to go
to war with Britain in order to remain in the Union with Great Britain. Westminster,
therefore, stipulated in the Anglo-Irish Treaty that until such a time as Northern Ireland
voted to reunite with what was now referred to as the Irish Free State (Southern Ireland),
Ulster would remain in the Union and be governed by the Government of Ireland Act of
1920.17 The North and the South were to be divided by a border, an act known as the
partition of Ireland, which was drawn in a way to ensure there was a ruling Protestant
majority in the north, making it two-thirds Protestant and one-third Catholic.18 As the
state of Northern Ireland adjusted to its new political status, Protestants realized that
although they were the political majority in 1920, if they did not work to consolidate their
power, it was possible they might not always be so. They quickly found that by
controlling housing, they could control political representation, which meant ensuring
elections, in particular, were always fixed in their favor.
In 1919 the Housing (Ireland) Act had been passed in Westminster which
stipulated that it was “the duty of the local authority of every urban district or town . . . to
consider the needs of the district or town with respect to the provision of houses for the
working classes, and within three months after the passing of this Act, and thereafter as
often as occasion arises, to prepare and submit to the Local Government Board a scheme
for the exercise of their powers.”19 The bill made it clear that the state was responsible for
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ensuring that the citizens of its state were decently housed. However, it did not appear as
if the newly formed parliament of Northern Ireland, called Stormont for the castle chosen
to serve as the North’s seat of power, was going to act upon the bill with any immediate
haste.
As early as 1922, newspapers in the North were reporting on the housing
shortages in the city of Derry. Under the Housing Act, local bodies like the Londonderry
Corporation, a committee in charge of general city maintenance (such as bridge upkeep,
roads, and housing), were in part responsible for paying for the construction of new
houses, although Westminster would refund them the money once the new houses were
completed.20 In Stormont, Hugh Pollock, Minister of Finance, told his fellow MPs that
Westminster would provide one million pounds to aid in building new public houses, but
that money would only take effect on any housing schemes begun after August of 1921.
Any current schemes would be the responsibility of Stormont. Later Stormont suggested
that only private enterprises undertake new housing schemes, even though they
acknowledged this would not provide enough housing to address the shortage across the
province.21 However, once Stormont had the ability to start applying Westminster’s
subsidies towards improvement like housing, few to no housing schemes were started
even though there was ample evidence that the North was in need of development.
This practice of inaction by local councils would invariably lead to a severe
housing shortage across Ulster but was especially acute in the city of Derry. By 1923 the
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Londonderry Sentinel reported that the Londonderry Corporation was refusing to build
any new houses on the grounds of material expenses, despite there being “a well known
shortage of houses.”22 The Corporation at first did not seem concerned by such claims,
and as the 1920s progressed it was common to see local newspapers declaring “there is
great need for more and better housing as there is much congestion, and many of the
houses of the working class are very bad.”23 By 1925 the Minister of Home Affairs, Sir
Dawson Bates reported in Stormont that in Belfast alone there was an estimated shortage
of 10,000 homes.24 Although he claimed that the housing shortage was not as acute
across the rest of the province, the Derry Journal ran a story that claimed Cahir Healy,
MP for Fermanagh and Tyrone, had gone to Derry to look into the housing situation in St.
Columb’s Wells, and “witnessed one of the most distressful scenes ever witnessed in a
Christian country; a poor woman was dying; her children around the death-bed were
sobbing while kindly neighbours were holding umbrellas over the bed to keep the rain
off.” The article reported that these houses where the “distressful scene” had taken place
had been condemned twenty years ago, and that the city acknowledged the reason these
people still lived there was due to the shortage of houses, but that “it was very difficult
thing to start to put people out on the street” in order to update them. Although rents in
this particular area had been raised from 3s to 5s with the understanding that some of the
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money would be used for improvements, plans did not appear forthcoming.25 Perhaps
because of this and other such episodes, Stormont and the Londonderry Corporation
finally started to address the housing situation of the working class and poor.26
By the end of the 1920s, some housing schemes had been introduced and
successfully implemented (notable a few were subsidized housing schemes), however,
this was a short-lived period.27 Between 1928 and 1929 some 500 houses had been
erected in the city of Derry but local newspapers claimed that only “the most courageous
would inhabit them.”28 Tenants complained that there were cracks and openings
appearing in the walls, the walls were extremely thin, they were damp, some suffered
from dry-rot, “and in one case a lodger is reported to have dropped through a floor laid
down only a few years ago.”29 The members of the Corporation declined to take a tour of
the houses to see for themselves if the homes they had built were actually “condemned as
unfit for habitation.” Even in Stormont, MPs recognized that not only were these
dwellings substandard but that 500 new buildings were not nearly enough to satisfy the
housing shortage.30 Although the Londonderry Corporation had fulfilled some of its
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obligations under the Housing Act of 1919, when tallied together it was only the bare
minimum needed to abate the housing shortage, and evidently, they had not exerted much
effort to ensure that the houses were of good quality.31 Neither did Stormont MPs feel the
need to request they speed up or expand their efforts.32
The lack of extensive housing schemes, not just in Derry, but throughout all of
Northern Ireland was directly influenced by Unionist MPs in Stormont attempting to
consolidate their control of Ulster by limiting those who had voting rights. When the
Government of Ireland Act was passed in 1920, Unionists in Ulster realized that this act
“handed almost all political power into their hands, [and] they realized they could make
effective use of it to buttress and protect the new Northern Ireland.”33 The Act stipulated
that the Parliament of Northern Ireland could not “make a law so as either directly or
indirectly to establish or endow any religion, or . . . impose any disability or
disadvantage, on account of religious belief or religious or ecclesiastical status.”34
However, those Unionists who had just threatened Britain with war if they did not allow
Ulster to remain in the Union with Great Britain were not willing to allow Irish Catholics,
who supported the nationalist cause of the South, to potentially undermine their authority
in the North. They, therefore, found ways to weigh political representation in their favor,
in part by controlling housing development and the electoral ward boundaries of certain
neighborhoods.
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In 1922 Northern Ireland’s first prime minister, Sir James Craig, made the decision to
abolish the voting system known as proportional representation in local elections, so as
to, in the Nationalist perspective, “prevent minority [Catholic] representation altogether
[in local government].”35 The system of proportional representation ensured that both
Catholics and Protestants received equal representation at all levels of government, no
matter how large or small their voting ward, and was a “safeguard for Catholic and
Protestant minorities in the two pars of Ireland and also a symbol of respect for their
views.”36 Craig reasoned that “after all the attempts which have been made in the
Imperial House to protect our interests by doing away with Proportional Representation [I
am] . . . convinced so far as the South and West were concerned that Proportional
Representation would secure no benefits for loyalists there, and so far as we are
concerned in the North, we would be prejudiced by having Proportional Representation
as part of our electoral system whether for the Parliament here or for local
Government.”37 In Westminster, Unionist MPs argued that, due to the high and growing
Catholic population, the abolition of proportional representation could have a detrimental
long-term effect on the Unionist cause: Unionist MPs would struggle to continually
return Unionist heavy local councils.38 This was not an unfounded argument when in
1920 Derry, where Catholics comprised 50.2 of the city’s overall 40,750 population,
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succeeded in returning a Catholic mayor under said system.39 Since Catholics tended to
have large families, in places like Derry it was not unreasonable for Unionists to think the
Nationalist party might actually challenge their authority over time. Although
proportional representation was as fair a system as could be implemented in a country
like Northern Ireland, Craig knew that if Derry, Tyrone, and other areas where Catholics
were the majority, continued to return Nationalist councils, such a system could
potentially undermine the stability of the union between Northern Ireland and Great
Britain.
Even though Northern Ireland’s first official election had “produced a
comfortable majority for the Unionist party,” earning them forty of the fifty-two seats in
Stormont, the actions of the Unionist party in the ensuing months and years indicated that
Unionists were worried about preventing future Catholic dominance.40 When the
Nationalist party went from controlling 25 of the 80 local councils in 1920 to only 2 in
1924, it became obvious that the Unionist party was determined to keep power out of
Nationalist sympathizers’ hands.41 This meant that Catholics were almost completely
deprived of political representation. Unionist MPs in Westminster had fought against the
implementation of proportional representation, arguing from the onset that the system
would not greatly change the outcome of elections in favor of one party or the other.42
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Additionally, as it clearly stated in the Government of Ireland Bill, “after three years from
the day of the first meeting . . . Parliament may alter the qualification and registration of
the electors, the law relating to elections and the questioning of elections, [and] the
constituencies and the distribution of the members among the constituencies,” Craig was
within his rights to change the voting system.43
Westminster was against the ending of proportional representation because they
feared it would damage their relationship with the Irish Free State. Westminster had
insisted that the Dáil Éireann (Parliament of Ireland) provide a way for Protestants in
Southern Ireland to have representation since they were the minority in the South. By
failing to insist that Catholics in the North be shown the same courtesy, Westminster was
effectively disregarding the agreement made between all three countries (England,
Southern Ireland, and Northern Ireland) that “no law may be made either directly or
indirectly to endow any religion . . . or impose any disability on account of religious
belief.”44 When the Government of Ireland Act was being drafted, Irish MPs knew that
unless the system in the North was used for elections, “it would be perfectly impossible
for the Northern minority to have any representation on the Senate.”45 MP Samuel
Roberts argued that Unionists “will get a large enough majority whatever system they
have,” and that their reasons for the system being flawed were not justified as the system
seemed to be working fine in Southern Ireland.46 However, Unionists remained adamant.
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William Coote, a Unionist MP for South Tyrone, argued that Westminster had
created the state of Northern Ireland so that Unionists could remain “British” rather than
having to answer to a Catholic parliament in Dublin. If proportional representation were
to be maintained, Coote argued, Unionists would ultimately lose the right to maintain
Imperial interests in Ulster, which would defeat the purpose of the state of Northern
Ireland.47 He even went so far as to claim that under proportional representation it might
be certain voters would “allow a class of men to come into these councils who will not be
careful of the public funds,” implying that the subsidies which Ulster received from
Britain would be squandered if the wrong people were in charge.48 In Stormont Craig
reasoned that “Proportional Representation would produce a . . . combination of motley
groups making for instability and enforced coalition and enforced dictation for a minority
group.”49 While such debates did not make much of an impression on MPs in
Westminster, the British government ultimately backed down when Craig threatened to
resign––which would have placed Northern Ireland under Westminster’s direct
jurisdiction again, something they desired to avoid.50
Britain had a long-standing tradition of keeping all issues Irish at arm’s length.
Although its “Irish Question” was one that occupied government proceedings more so
than other colonies, once the settlements between the Irish Free State and Northern
Ireland were finalized, the British Government largely viewed that Question as having
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been answered.51 Britain was eager to leave Stormont to legislate for itself, letting Irish
affairs stay in Ireland. However, when Craig proposed abolishing proportional
representation, some in Westminster opposed, feeling that such a proposition fell under
Section 75 of the Government of Ireland Act which stated: “the supreme authority of the
Parliament of the United Kingdom shall remain unaffected and undiminished over all
persons, matters, and things in Ireland and every part thereof.”52 Those against Craig’s
proposal viewed that Section 75 gave Westminster the right to keep proportional
representation in place.53 However, in 1923, at almost the exact same time the issue of
proportional representation was being discussed, the Speaker of the House in
Westminster, John Whitley, declared:
With regard to those subjects which have been delegated to the
Government of Northern Ireland, questions must be asked of Ministers in
Northern Ireland, and not in this House. In the case of those subjects
which were reserved to this Parliament, questions can be addressed here to
the appropriate Ministers . . . but . . . I would say that this right does not
cover matters of administration for which a Minister in Northern Ireland is
responsible. We give a subvention in aid of police, but outside the
metropolitan area the administration and responsibility are local.54
This declaration set a dangerous precedent which effectively inhibited MPs in
Westminster from either discussing Northern Ireland or interfering with affairs they felt
were for the “concern of the Belfast Parliament.”55 Even though Section 75 did give
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Westminster the right to intercede and ensure that equal representation was maintained in
Ulster, because of the precedent set by Whitely, Westminster would effectively turn a
blind eye to any and all dealings in Stormont, no matter how questionable.
Aided by this statute, Craig abolished proportional representation and put in its
place a system referred to as first-past-the-post. This system guaranteed that the person
winning the majority of votes would be elected. One MP from Westminster, Herbert
Samuel, who was in favor of retaining proportional representation, described first-pastthe-post as “whether you take a number of people competing for precedence, or a number
of horses competing for victory on the strength of their individual prowess or capacity,
clearly you want to select one from among several and give the prize, whatever it may
be.”56 However, in Westminster’s House of Lords, MPs such as Viscount Ullswater,
countered such logic by arguing “you can only make a Government out of a
homogeneous majority. Under such a system [proportional representation] you do not get
a homogeneous majority, you get a mongrel majority.” He declared his support of
implementing first-past-the-post in Ulster, even though he and his fellow members in the
House of Lords acknowledged that the system “shall probably have minorities wiped out
in many counties, not appearing at all; the majorities will be inflated; there will be huge
majorities in many cases, and the minorities will, I suppose, as usual, have to suffer.”57
Members in the House of Lords argued that any electoral system had the potential to
produced “anomalies,” such as minorities receiving little representation, but that did not
necessarily mean that it was a biased system. Although an honest assessment of first-past-
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the-post revealed that it was an attempt to ensure only one party was voted into office, by
claiming that proportional representation never allowed for a unified parliament,
Unionists were able to further their own aims of creating a “Protestant Parliament and a
Protestant State.”58 Although the biases of this system were evident, as were Stormont’s
desired to use it over proportional representation, again Westminster did not prevent its
passing into law.59
Although first-past-the-post secured greater political influence for the Unionist
party, it was not an absolute guarantee. Logically, it was not necessary for Craig to
implement so many measures to ensure that the Unionist party was not overwhelmed by
the Nationalist party. Proportional representation, in the long run, was actually an
absolute guarantee that they would always have a serving body in Stormont. Considering
that by 1937 the Catholic population in Derry had increased by ten percent from 1926,
while the overall population had only increased by five per cent, proportional
representation was a safety net for Unionists interests to live fairly next to Catholic
ones.60 Sadly though, Craig did not appear to be interested in fair representation and took
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one final measure to ensure that Stormont remained dominated by Protestants, sacrificing
long-term stability for short-lived political dominance.
In order to further ensure that the first-past-the-post system always returned the
desired candidate, Craig ordered that the electoral boundaries of each major constituency
be redrawn to ensure that votes weighed in the Unionists’ favor. This practice, commonly
called gerrymandering, had been in existence since the nineteenth century, instituted by
Elbridge Gerry of Boston, Massachusetts, who in the early nineteenth century redrew the
electoral boundary lines in Massachusetts in order to give Republicans the advantage
over the Federalists in senatorial elections.61 The practice was so effective that Joseph
Devlin, Nationalist MP for Belfast, Central, reported in Westminster that due to the
redrawing of the boundaries “it took about 40,000 voters to return me to the Northern
Parliament while in the case of the Chief Whip of the Unionist party of Northern Ireland
it required only 29,000 voters.”62 Others argued that together these systems “would have
the effect of disfranchising a quarter of the population.”63 In Derry the result of
gerrymandering was so blatant even Unionist MPs looking back at Craig’s actions would
admit that Catholics had every right to claim they had been discriminated against.64 In
Westminster, Unionist MPs did not deny this was so, but no actions were taken to correct
this blatant manipulation of political power.65
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As early as 1929, debates in Stormont reveal that Nationalist MPs were fully
aware of this dynamic and accused the Corporation of neglecting housing development
schemes for rural country laborers––who happened to be Nationalists.66 By controlling
housing development, both private and publicly funded, it kept the status quo of
Protestant hegemony. Protestants controlled the Corporation, which meant they
simultaneously benefited from gerrymandering and that it was in their best interest to see
to it that those lines remained unchanged.67 By May of 1936, Catholics in Derry
demanded that an inquiry be held to investigate the voting results of the gerrymandered
wards.68 However, by June according to the Stormont parliamentary papers, even if the
inquiry did turn up wrongdoing, it was clear that Unionists ministers did not plan to
acknowledge it. The Mister of Home Affairs, Dawson Bates, denied in Stormont that his
department was not going acknowledge the evidence of the inquiry’s inspector, but
considering that ward boundaries were not redrawn, it would be possible to infer that
Bates did disregard any evidence of wrongdoing turned up by the inquiry.69 Building
delays continued, which Unionist MPs never did have an adequate explanation for, and
successive prime ministers never did question.70 In Westminster, in keeping with the
1923 precedent of not discussing matters pertaining to Northern Ireland, British MPs
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refused to listen to accusations voiced by Nationalist MPs.71 The ward boundaries were
redrawn and unfortunately, housing would be used as a means to ensure the boundary
lines remained as they were until the late 1960s.
The 1930s saw little change from the 1920s, with newspapers carrying almost the
exact headlines that had peppered news stories ten years prior. Although this was the era
of Depression, Northern Ireland was mainly affected by the Crash in terms of the
subsidies which it received from Britain. As early as May of 1930, Hugh MacDowell
Pollock, Minister of Finance told his fellow MPs in Stormont “between our Revenue and
Expenditure, the financial position of the State has now reached the verge of danger point
. . . in respect of State assistance, the limit has been reached, and that they [Local
Authorities] must rely on their own resources for any further expenditure they
contemplate. The only alternative is heavy additional taxation.”72 Although the
Depression might have affected the amount of money Northern Ireland received from
Britain and therefore made building schemes difficult, it cannot be ignored that had the
Londonderry Corporation and Stormont addressed the housing shortage in the 1920s,
when the funds were available, some of the discomfort felt by the population might have
been avoided.
As it was, by the mid-1930s, newspapers were once again reporting “there are
many houses in occupation unfit for human habitation, and the occupants have no
alternative than to shelter in circumstances disgraceful to civilization . . . overcrowding

“Derry Gerrymander Proposal: An Inquiry to be Held,” Donegal (Ire.) News, 2 May 1936, p. 5, Irish
Newspaper Archive; Cahir Healy, Statue of Westminster Bill, 20 November 1931, Parliamentary Papers,
House of Commons, 5th ser., vol. 259 (1931), cols. 1232–35.
72
Hugh MacDowell Pollock, The Budget, 27 May 1930, Stormont Papers, House of Commons, vol. 12
(1930), cols. 1543–44.
71

33

was still a marked feature . . . and the housing shortage was outstanding in working class
districts. Many families were . . . confined to single room accommodations.”73 By 1936 a
report published in the Londonderry Sentinel by Dr. W. R. Abernethy, a city medical
superintendent officer of health, found that “it is a matter for regret that under this
(housing conditions) head there is no material progress to note since the last annual report
was submitted [1935]. The number of working-class houses erected by private enterprise
is totally inadequate to meet the requirements of a growing population and deteriorating
property.”74 Abernethy went on to state that repairs to existing structures had been made,
but that many of them were “beyond repair or are otherwise unsuitable for human
habitation.” Stormont could no longer ignore the situation and between 1938 and 1939, a
new housing bill was presented and debated, which was designed to address the issue of
substandard housing in urban districts.75 The Derry Journal reported that the
“Government would be willing to contribute one-third of the cost,” but that it would only
“provide 25 or 30 houses which were very much needed in the town.”76 Given that Derry
had had a housing shortage since 1920, thirty homes was hardly enough to address
overcrowding. Additionally, it did not appear that any development actually did take
place. It must be taken into account that the Depression did have a hand to play in the
dearth of new homes going up, but few could deny that still Stormont and the
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Londonderry Corporation were not actively seeking ways to address substandard
dwellings or overcrowding.
In part because of financial strains brought on by the Great Depression and in part
because of Stormont’s delays in initiating new housing schemes, by the 1940s the
housing crisis was severe. The Belfast Newsletter reported that “the census returns
revealed, there are in Belfast and Londonderry too many people occupying a single room
or two rooms, and in many other towns there is overcrowding.”77 In 1944 the Housing
Committee of the Planning Advisory Board found that “about 50,000 houses only, or an
average of 2,500 per annum, were built between 1919 and 1939.”78 Overcrowding was so
severe that as many as ten to eighteen people were living in a two-bedroom apartment.79
Things were becoming so bad that it was becoming harder for Stormont to ignore the
situation, however, they were also unwilling to take measures which would give
Nationalists greater political power. The electoral lines were dependent upon maintaining
the literal shape of Catholic neighborhoods. If they were to start widespread housing
schemes, they would either have to redraw the lines or concede that Catholics would gain
greater political power.
Conditions in the Bogside, a small subdivision in Derry, were especially acute,
and by 1946 citizens of Derry claimed that the “[Londonderry] Corporation [was] directly
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responsible for the housing shortage in the city.”80 In Stormont William Grant, Minister
of Health and Local Government, countered that “with their small administrative and
technical staff they could not possibly make progress with housing at a rate which would
satisfy them or the citizens.”81 Whether this was true or the ministers were attempting to
stall once again on any new building schemes, as World War II came to a close they no
longer had a choice in the matter. Urban decay and overcrowding was a problem facing
the entire United Kingdom, and Westminster’s newly elected Labour Government
realized that it could no longer allow its working classes to live in congested and
substandard housing.82 After the war, it was found that the U.K. had a shortage of
roughly two million homes, the largest shortage recorded, to which it “declared in its
statement of post-war housing policy that its first objective . . . was the provision of ‘a
separate dwelling for every family that wishes to have one.’”83 A welfare state was
implemented which saw “a massive expansion of the public health service, of public
education and of related areas in the public sector,” but which the Northern Ireland
government only “reluctantly implemented.”84 This welfare state was built with the
intention of improving the lives of UK citizens, however, in the issues of housing,
Northern Irish officials found that they had to be cautious with how they followed the
new public welfare policies.
In an effort to comply with the policies of the new welfare state, in 1945 Stormont
created the Northern Ireland Housing Trust (NIHT), a public body, “consist[ing] of five
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members, appointed by the Minister of Health and Local Government, who serve[d]
without salary or fee,” which “had the power to build and manage housing estates––
allocating tenancies without any regard to religion.”85 In order to address the housing
shortage, “local authorities [in Ulster] were to build half of the 100,000 new houses
needed and private builders, with the help of government subsidies, were to build a
quarter,” and the NIHT were to build the remaining 25,000 houses.86 What made the
NIHT and their task of housing improvement different from bodies like the Londonderry
or Belfast corporations was that these houses were to be public, or subsidized, housing
for the working class and unemployed. Prior to the 1940s, houses were in private hands
or maintained by landlords. In Derry, the new welfare program created “a novel
phenomenon; systematic and extensive discrimination in the allocation of public housing.
Previously there had been little public housing to discriminate over.”87 In theory, the
NIHT was meant to work independently of local authorities and allocate houses based on
need, not on faith or political affiliation. However, they were also dependent on the local
Council’s allocation of land in order to build the new houses and were required to work
with the local authorities on any new building sites.88 As Grant had pointed out, the
Londonderry Corporation was too small a body to deal with the housing situation on its
own, so the NIHT had little choice but to coordinate their building efforts with the
Corporation.89 However, the Corporation’s main objective was to “ensure that the NIHT
building would not destablise the delicate territorial arrangements which allowed
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Unionist to maintain control of [local councils].”90 Although they could not stop
development entirely, they could delay the NIHT. One such example was that of the
Creggan Estates.91
Intended to start in 1945, in 1948 the NIHT began construction of the Creggan
Estates––situated on the west side of the River Foyle, not far from the Bogside. The
agreement between the NIHT and the Corporation was that the NIHT would build 537
house estates on Corporation-owned land at Creggan, “which it would then sell half of
these houses to the Corporation on completion.”92 However, considering Derry’s Catholic
population alone, these were not nearly enough residences to address the overcrowding in
the city. In the annual report of the NIHTs progress in 1953, Mr. Bell said that those who
conducted the initial assessment of how many homes were needed in order to address the
shortage, “seriously under-estimated the need.” Instead of taking the population into
consideration “only one new house was allowed for to replace each unfit house,
disregarding the fact that the unfit houses were also frequently the most fantastically
overcrowded . . . a better analysis would have increased the general total by at least 10%,
and there must have been further decay and obsolescence of many houses since 1944 to
add to the 100,000 then estimated as needed.” However, Bell acknowledged the fact that,
“the standards for over-crowding and unfitness for habitation were set deliberately low,”
which seems to indicate the possibility that there were some who did not seem concerned
by the issue of overcrowding.93 Realizing that they were not building enough homes for
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the size of Derry’s overall population, and as building was progressing on the Creggan
Estates at such a slow rate, in the interim, the Londonderry Corporation suggested
converting “the former U.S. Navy camp at Springtown . . . to use as temporary housing
accommodation,” in order to alleviate some of the overcrowding in Derry until the
Creggan Estates could be completed.94
At first members of the Corporation and the Trust thought that converting the huts
Springtown would offer “great possibilities for a temporary housing scheme and later as
the site for a permanent housing estate.”95 However, by April, the scheme had been
abandoned.96 The justification for this was that each hut would cost between £290–390 in
order to make them habitable (which would include getting hot water to each hut),
costing the state roughly “£70,000 on this avowedly temporary measure . . . a scandalous
waste of public money.”97 Although this caused outrage among the Catholic community,
because the Corporation continued to delay further building in Derry, many people
started squatting in the Springtown camp, which lasted until well in the 1960s.98 The
Corporation, seeing that over one hundred families who had moved in by 1946, agreed to
“where possible, provided light, water and other amenities,” but insisted that the squatters
pay rent.99 By December of 1947, Stormont Nationalist MP, Eddie McAteer, who would
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later become a key figure during the civil rights movement, lobbied to have, at the very
least, Stormont install electricity in those huts which were occupied before the winter
truly set in. The Minister of Health and Local Government informed him that this would
not be possible and that the squatters were at Springtown without Stormont’s
authorization, so they were not technically under any obligation to improve the squatter’s
quality of life.100
By 1949, the Londonderry Sentinel reported that only 153 of the promised 537
houses in the Creggan were completed and that the NIHT had acquired land in the North
Ward (split between Catholics and Protestants) to build eighty-two houses.101 Some of
the reasons given for the delays were bad weather, not enough workmen, and scarcity of
building materials.102 Although the Springtown Camp seemed like a ready-made housing
estate and an answer to many of the housing problems facing Derry, the reasons behind
the delays and abandoned plans had once again to do with voting and Protestant control.
Until the outbreak of the civil rights movement in 1968, the few Nationalist MPs
who still attended Westminster debates pled their case as often as they could. Sadly,
however, in keeping with its non-interference rule, Westminster refused to discuss the
subject.103 Anthony Mulvey, Nationalist MP for Fermanagh and Tyrone, in 1948 made a
thirty-two-minute long speech in the House of Commons arguing “The result of the
gerrymander in Northern Ireland is that one Tory vote has the electoral value of two
Nationalist or Labour votes. The gerrymander prevents democratic representation in any
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country, but I know of no other country in Europe in which this form of administration is
carried on except Northern Ireland. . . . [in Derry] 29,000 Nationalist and Labour voters
get eight seats, while 18,000 Tories get 12 seats.” Although he offered numerous
examples of how this system undermined the representation of Catholics in Ulster, the
next speaker, Major Legge-Bourke, responded only by saying “the hon. Member for
Fermanagh and Tyrone will presumably be answered by His Majesty’s Government later
in the Debate. I dare say that the answer is that the matter is having urgent consideration,
but, if so, I do not suppose that the hon. Member will be satisfied with that answer. . . . I
do not propose to follow him any further than that,” and then turns the attention of the
House to a bill that is about to be amended.104 It is noteworthy that none of the
Westminster MPs choose to pick up the subject again.
A year later, a Cabinet Minute revealed that on the point of gerrymandering in
Northern Ireland, the British government’s position was decidedly non-interference, and
seemingly unconcerned with the state of affairs in Stormont. In 1948 while on a tour of
Canada, John Costello, prime minister of the Irish Free State, made the announcement
that Ireland was leaving the British Commonwealth. The British government, lacking the
ability to stop Costello, started drafting what came to be known as the Ireland Act of
1949. Although the majority of the Act was the United Kingdom’s official relationship
with Ireland, it also outlined voting rights and requirements for Northern Ireland. These
requirements, although potentially an odd addition to an act that was between Britain and
Irish Free State (called Éire after 1949), forced Britain to, briefly, acknowledge that
perhaps they were not dealing with Ulster’s political situation in a fair manner.
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Unionists feared that once Southern Ireland left the Commonwealth, in places like
Derry where the border was so close to the Irish Free State, and were in the North “only a
temporary capacity,” to do work or business, might attempt to vote in local elections,
swaying them in favor of the Nationalist party.105 Whether this was a legitimate fear or
not, they demanded that Westminster put in a “new clause seeking to ensure that there
shall be a residence qualification,” in order to vote in the North.106 Clement Attlee, then
British prime minister, wrote in a draft for the Ireland Bill, “there is undoubtedly some
risk in this respect and it is difficult to deny Northern Ireland the protection for which it
asks.”107 Westminster, somewhat begrudgingly, conceded to Stormont’s demand, and the
final draft of the Ireland Act stipulated that “a person shall not be entitled to vote as an
elector at an election of a person to serve as a Member of the Parliament of the United
Kingdom for a constituency in Northern Ireland unless he was resident in Northern
Ireland during the whole of the period of three months ending on the qualifying date for
that election.”108 Although this phrase did not seem to hold much significance in terms of
housing requirements, in terms of defining political rights it revealed how much
Westminster desired to remain uninvolved in Northern Ireland’s affairs.
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When the Ireland Act was being drafted, discussions about how voting rights
were defined caused those in the Labour government to recognize that the manner in
which the Unionist party ran Ulster was not entirely above board. However, despite this
knowledge, Attlee’s government did not seem concerned with addressing the North’s
political imbalance. An exchange between Attlee, his deputy prime minister, Herbert
Morrison, and Aneurin Bevan, Minister of Health, during a Cabinet discussion of the
Ireland Act revealed this attitude.
A.B.: Cond[itions] of elect[ion] in N.I. casts doubt on rep[resentitive] characters
of N.I. Parl[iament] . . . [lack of discussion] means we are conniving at
gerrymandering.
P.M.: Both sides cheat on elections.
H.M.: Not our business––don’t burn our fingers.
Agreed: p[ost]pone disc[ussion] of this.109
Although Attlee and his Cabinet may have been troubled by the Unionist party’s
manipulation of the ward boundaries in Ulster, they still did not wish to involve
themselves in what they considered to be Irish affaires. The section in the Ireland Act
which outlined who did and did not have a right to vote could have potentially raised a
debate on the subject in Westminster, a topic Nationalist MPs would have been happy to
exploit. Calling into question the fact that in most of the North’s constituencies Unionists
won the elections before a vote was even cast, and the elections were by this point mere
formalities, would have forced Westminster to acknowledge they were not putting a stop
to a practice that denied half of Ulster’s population political representation.110 By not
drawing great attention to who were eligible to vote in the North, the British government
sidestepped the issue of gerrymandering, which would have brought up the issue of
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jurisdiction in parliament. Westminster once again seemed content to let Unionists run
Northern Ireland as they wanted.111
At the same time that the Ireland Act was being finalized, the Representation of
the People Bill was passed, first in Westminster, and then in Stormont, which was
intended to be an extension of the universal male suffrage act which had been introduced
in England in 1918. In Northern Ireland, this bill had the potential of destabilizing
Unionist control in the North. Stormont took one final measure to ensure that political
power remained weighted in their favor. An amendment was added to the Representation
of the People Bill, the Elections and Franchise Bill, which stipulated that tenants,
subtenants, children living with parents, and any other individual who did not own a
home could no longer vote in local elections.112 Conversely, for those who did own a
home, their spouse was allowed a vote, although not their adult children if they lived with
their parents.113 As the ownership Creggan was split between the Londonderry
Corporation and the NIHT as subsidized housing, this disqualified any person(s) who did
not own one of those flats or houses outright.114
By the mid-1950s, Eddie McAteer accused “the Corporation’s big new Creggan
Estate is in the South Ward where, however big the Nationalist vote, the same number of
members are returned.”115 Westminster did argue against any such amendment, but the
Bill passed Stormont and effectively excluded all persons in Northern Ireland from voting
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who were not householders.116 Through these efforts, the Unionists maintained control of
local councils and of parliament in Northern Ireland without worrying if the new housing
developments shifted the electoral lines. All these measures and attitudes created a
culture of resentment in Ulster, as Catholics lost more and more of their political power.
This was only made all the more poignant by the fact that their quality of life was tied
directly to their political rights.
Although all of the actions taken by Stormont from the 1920s to the 1960s––
gerrymandering, abolishing proportional representation, failing to address the housing
shortage, restrict the vote to householders, etc.––might have added tinder to the fire, it
was the issue of housing allocation which ultimately proved to be the catalyst for the
emergence of the civil rights movement in 1968. The effects of the Unionist party’s
political maneuvering was felt across Ulster, but at the local level in Derry, the issue of
who got a house and when was a more immediate and long-term effect of the Unionist
party’s sectarian policies towards the Catholic community. Ultimately, housing proved to
be Northern Ireland’s undoing, as those who finally decided to challenge Unionist control
of Derry in the late 1960s used housing as a rallying point for disenfranchised
Catholics.117
The system which the NIHT used in order to allocate the houses which they built
was simply referred to as the point system. Even though housing developments like the
Creggan Estates were supposed to be “allocated to the applicants most in need,” this did
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not always prove to be the case.118 The point system was in theory supposed to be
nonpartisan and anonymous; “no names were submitted to the Council. Applicants for
houses were referred to by letters and the number of points were placed opposite the
various letters. The Council allocated the houses without knowing who the applicants
were.”119 However, once those lists were compiled, the Mayor of Derry filtered “in
consultation with the city housing manager, a Corporation employee,” likely a Unionist,
and then proceeded to assign houses “in accordance with his personal judgment.”120
Eamonn McCann, who would later be one of the key figures of the civil rights
movement, recalled in his memoir, War in an Irish Town, “the only way to get a
Corporation house . . . was to convince the mayor that you ought to get one, and members
of his local Orange lodge were obviously better placed then Bogsiders to do this. One of
the most common sights in Derry Guildhall was that of a gaunt woman from our
[Catholic] area down with her children pleading with the mayor in the corridor: ‘Please,
Mr. Anderson, we have been on the list for fifteen years.’”121 Nationalists spoke out
against the system, claiming “houses are allocated, not for the purpose of providing
houses for the people and greatest need to, but rather for the building up of the Unionist
elements in certain Nationalist areas.”122
The point system, rather than being the unbiased system it was intended to be,
became one more way for the Unionist party to reinforce their political control of the
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North. Newspapers in the early 1950s relayed that after the Mayor had made his decision
on house allocation in the North Ward in Derry, “of the 228 houses allocated in January
last seven of them were allocated to Catholics, or a percentage of 3 per cent, in an area
which was 40 percent Catholic.”123 There were numerous accusations of large Catholic
families living in one room “hovels” being passed over for newly-wed Protestant couples
and single individuals, for which Stormont officials never did offer adequate
explanations.124 By 1958 Stormont’s Minister of Health and Local Government, John
Andrews, seemed to think that the 192 houses completed between 1950 and 1959 were a
sufficient number to satisfy the need in Derry, even though Eddie McAteer reminded the
minister that there was a “backlog of 1,500 applications.” As was almost always the case,
the minister offered no response to what McAteer called “quite a pitiful contribution” to
the housing shortage.125 The point system was designed to house people in need in a
nonpartisan manner, but as the 1960s neared, the lists of those waiting for subsidized
housing lengthened, and housing development retained its slow pace.126
Until the 1960s, the protests to Stormont’s conduct, the failure to erect new
houses, and the issues with housing allocation were relatively small.127 The few
Nationalist MPs like McAteer and Healy were rarely, if ever, listened to when they
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brought up any topic in Stormont that had to do with the Catholic community and
discrimination.128 Westminster still did not want to get involved, and even though life
was difficult for those waiting for houses, they did not move to fight against the unjust
treatment of bodies like the Londonderry Corporation.129 However, 1960 opened with a
small episode which indicated that the Catholic community was beginning to tire of the
status quo, and foreshadowed the explosion which went off in 1968.
Those who had been squatting in the Springtown camp since the mid-1940s,
enduring its terrible conditions but having little option to go elsewhere, in 1959 had
experienced a fire that was not fatal but revealed how precarious the situation at
Springtown was.130 McAteer urged his fellow MPs that the Londonderry Corporation be
instructed to address their situation, but by December of 1960, only two families from the
camp had been rehoused.131 Well over four hundred families lived in the camp, so
McAteer challenged the Minister of Health and Local Government, Andrews, if he
believed that sufficient progress on the matter was being made. Andrews replied that
“this camp is not situated in the Londonderry rural district area. It is not a direct
obligation of this council to clear the camp and provide alternative accommodation, but it
is doing what it can to help.”132 Although this was a civilized debate in Stormont, in
October, actions of desperate men and women proved that the citizens of Ulster were
growing tired of Stormont’s inaction.
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During a meeting of the Londonderry Corporation and the Derry’s Town Council,
twelve women and two men refused to leave the public gallery in the Guildhall, the
building where the local council of Derry met, until they had voiced their grievances on
the Corporation’s slow progress of rehousing them and the other residents of Springtown.
Although the Corporation had initially promised houses on Coach Street in Derry to the
residents of the camp, they had instead decided to give the houses to another group of
people. Unionist leader and Chairman of the Londonderry Corporation housing subcommittee, G. S. Glover, told the group from Springtown “it is distressing [to] take away
houses which we genuinely wanted to hand over to deserving cases in Springtown Camp
but unfortunately they will have to wait a little longer.”133 Although this was hardly a
riot, it revealed that the general population was no longer willing to sit and wait for
another forty years while Unionist MPs made more excuses about why they could not
house those of a certain faith, or why new housing developments were not going up. This
seen indicated that change, led by the people, was on the horizon.
Although this episode hinted at what was to come, it would not be until 1968 that
the citizens of Derry decided that they had finally had enough. The NIHT was failing to
make any progress because “the Corporation limited most of the NIHT’s activities to the
[Catholic] South Ward . . . by 1966, the NIHT was giving notice that there was ‘virtually
no land left for housing within the city boundary’. The Corporation’s housing police had
made Derry one of the most overcrowded cities in the whole of Britain and Ireland.”134
The Creggan by the 1960s housed approximately 15,000 people, which was almost one-
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third of the total population of Derry and was overwhelmingly Catholic.135 Nationalists
accused that when it came to housing allocation, rather than the needs of the applicant
being taken into considerations, those in charge of appointing first considered, “‘are we
going to hold Derry?’ Are we going to keep a hold on the gerrymander which had taken
place in Derry? We cannot give control of the city [to the Catholics].’”136 However,
people were beginning to accept that the Unionist element simply was not fazed by such
accusations, and discontent on the ground was beginning to grow louder.
Westminster too had not relented on its 1923 statute, even though younger Labour
MPs were beginning to raise issues like equality before the law.137 In 1965 Labour MP,
Eric Heffer, dared to raise the issue of discrimination in housing allocation in
Westminster. The Deputy Speaker of the House, Samuel Storey, informed Heffer that he
was out of order, to which he responded “I wish to ask why it was out of order for the
question of discrimination to be discussed. I ask because I understand that under Section
75 we have ultimate responsibility for Northern Ireland. Therefore, it seems that in any
discussion of Northern Ireland any relevant matters connected with Northern Ireland are
in order. I should like you to explain this point.” To which Storey replied, “what is in
order in this debate is what the United Kingdom Government are responsible for. For
instance, discrimination in housing in Northern Ireland is not a matter for the United
Kingdom Government; it is a matter for the Northern Ireland Government. If there is any
discrimination it would be contrary to the [Government of Ireland] Act and would be
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actionable in the courts. There is no responsibility on Ministers in this House.”138 In
response to this seemingly unending cycle of inaction, the Derry Housing Action
Committee (DHAC) formed, which was a group that would finally move to challenge the
status quo of Derry’s housing issue.
Although the agitation led by the DHAC on the street in 1968 about Derry’s
housing situation would ultimately be the event which what would spark Northern
Ireland’s civil rights movement and ensuing Troubles, housing was an issue long before
the DHAC used it as a rallying point in the North’s fight for its civil liberties. The
Unionist Party’s use of housing as a means to retain their political control of the North
was a point of contention from the day of Northern Ireland’s birth, which current
histories of Northern Ireland have not given great attention too. Gerrymandering,
abolishing proportional representation, and making home ownership mandatory to vote in
local elections were far older issues in Ulster’s political history, but because the DHAC
led the charge in the streets about the outcomes of those actions, current historians have
generally started their stories at the moment the DHAC was founded. The DHAC and
other groups interested in fighting for equality, like the Northern Ireland Civil Rights
Association, were more successful in their aims than were the Nationalist MPs, but by
examining the lead up to the DHAC’s founding, the story of Northern Ireland’s housing
crisis becomes all the more poignant. Overcrowding in houses standing since the
nineteenth century were truly unacceptable living conditions to subject half of Ulster’s
population too, which gives more gravity to the actions of the DHAC in their fight for
civil rights.
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Chapter 2
South Boston
Histories of Boston ignore housing as being one of the contributing factors to the
South Boston Busing Crisis. Rather housing is talked about as an isolated aspect of life in
Boston, one that created a “city of neighborhoods,” where Catholic Irish, Catholic Italian,
Jewish, and Protestant Yankee never intermixed. Boston was defined by its “turf” lines
that separated certain neighborhoods which “outsiders” never crossed.139 However, in the
case of South Boston, while all those things were true of the neighborhood, poor housing
conditions were a problem from the 1920s, right up to 1974 when the busing order was
handed down.
In the early 1970s, Michael Patrick MacDonald, who lived in South Boston as a
young boy and witnessed the busing crisis first hand, described in his memoir, All Souls:
A Family Story from Southie, that in the early 1970s, owning a “breakthrough,”
apartment, meaning that the wall between two apartments was knocked down, doubling
the apartment’s size, made a family the envy of the neighborhood. However, MacDonald
vividly recalls that his mother had to pull discarded furniture out of the dumpster in order
to furnish their extend apartment, an act that deeply embarrassed him.140 Later,
MacDonald suggested that poor housing had only contributed to the distribution of drugs
and gang violence, something that he argues, state lawmakers could not be bothered to
address.141 Subsidized housing, like in Derry, did not become a divisive issue until the

139

O’Connor, South Boston, My Home Town, 174–77.
MacDonald, All Souls, 109.
141
Ibid., 1–6. Throughout his memoir MacDonald subtly accuses Boston’s government of never trying to
improve conditions in the housing projects, but rather only maintained a status quo of welfare dependency
and substandard living conditions.
140

53

early 1960s; yet, Boston did not welcome its coming, whereas in Derry people fought for
its implementation. Although the order to desegregate South Boston’s high school was
the issue that set the neighborhood alight, its history of poor housing did ultimately play a
part in the frustration felt by the residents of South Boston towards their local
government.
At the start of the nineteenth century, Boston’s two political parties, the
Republicans who were almost exclusively of Protestant Anglo-Saxon descent, and the
Democrats who, after the mid-nineteenth century, were almost exclusively Irish
Catholics, developed an eye for an eye mentality towards one another. When the
Democrats were in power, namely in the position of the mayor, they denied downtown
Boston, the historic domain of the Republicans, the support of municipal projects, and
only focused on the “other” Boston. The Boston made up of working-class Irish
Catholics, who, in return for expanded municipal projects and jobs, gave their vote to the
candidate running in the local election that was one of “their” people. When the
Republicans were in charge, either with one of their own, or with an “acceptable”
Catholic, one they could control, jobs and salaries were cut, building projects cancelled,
and as the case with housing would be, they tended to turn a blind eye to the poor
conditions of neighborhoods who had inflicted a Democrat on the city. Housing played a
key role in solidifying the animosity between the Yankee Republicans and the Irish
Catholics, one that would have damaging consequences for the latter half of the twentieth
century.
Starting in the 1920s, Boston’s need for an expanded housing development was
directly influenced by its population spike in the mid-nineteenth century. From the 1850s
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to the mid-1920s, with the passing of the Immigrant Act of 1924, the population of
Boston more than doubled in size. In the nineteenth century the city of Boston had
annexed the surrounding townships––South Boston (1804), Roxbury (1868), Dorchester
(1870), Charleston, West Roxbury, and Brighton (1873)––to only then start receiving
thousands of Irish immigrants fleeing the effects of the Great Famine (1845–1852).142 In
1840 the population of Boston had been just under 85,000.143 By 1850, it was just short
of 150,000 and by 1860, it was just shy of 193,000.144 South Boston absorbed many of
these new arrivals, its population increasing from six thousand in 1835 to ten thousand in
1845, and “by 1855 there were over sixteen thousand people living in the peninsula, a
significant number of whom were recent [Irish] immigrants.”145 The majority of these
immigrants situated themselves in South Boston because of the better job opportunities
which the peninsula had to offer (glass and ironworks), yet their housing situation
followed similar patterns to other cities receiving tidal waves of Irish immigrants in the
nineteenth century.146
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Tenement houses were designed to accommodate as many people as possible, for
as cheaply as possible.147 The Famine Irish, lacking the means or the ability to seek other
accommodations, often had little choice but to accept the conditions of life in a tenement
house.148 In Boston, as more immigrants flooded into the city, the Protestant element
worried about the “vices” which would flow out the tenement neighborhoods, but little
was done to address the situation.149 By the twentieth century, the public recognized that
these buildings were unfit for human habitation and that new housing developments were
needed to alleviate their squalid conditions.150 A poem published in the Sacred Heart
Review lamented: “The children, oh! The children / Of want and woe and need, – / From
rows of teeming tenements / Their little faces plead! / From airless blocks of buildings, /
From the furnace of the street, / The voices of the children / All the summer long
entreat.”151 The issue of health among the working classes was becoming of greater
concern, and newspapers started to call on lawmakers to address the situation.152
However, it was not until the 1920s that the issue received any serious attention.153
In 1920 much of the discussion surrounding housing in Boston was the shortage
of homes and the funds needed in order to alleviate overcrowding. Numerous editorials
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referred to the shortage as “acute,” and urged the city to take steps to address the
situation.154 Although the city council had been asking the mayor at the time Andrew
James Peters, to address the situation since 1919, in March of 1920 Peters appointed a
Rents and Housing Commission (RHC) in order to investigate complaints made about
high rent prices and substandard living conditions.155 The Commission found that in areas
like South Boston, Charlestown, Dorchester, and Roxbury, all immigrant-heavy areas,
there were 3300 tenements standing vacant “because the houses afforded no bathtubs and
because single toilets for all tenants were located in the cellar.”156 Some of these homes
were generational, going back in a family’s possession as far as the Famine, but the
tenements were now dark, had no running water, and were unsanitary.157 The areas that
were receiving those fleeing these conditions were becoming congested and
overcrowded. The RHC and the Commission on the Necessaries of Life (CNL), told city
officials this would only be eased if new construction began, or if the existing tenements
were updated to higher standards of living.158
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The chairman of the CNL (a body also created at the beginning of 1920 tasked
with overseeing the city’s overall well-being much like the Londonderry Corporation),
John Sherburne, suggested that “steps be taken to have the landlords in these sections put
their buildings in first-class conditions . . . [which] would tend to send people back into
the isolated sections and relieve other districts which are congested.”159 Not only could
updating standing structures potentially solve some of the housing shortage, and not
require expensive new buildings, but it would keep neighborhoods in Boston from
becoming intermixed between immigrant Catholics and native Protestants. Similar to
their Protestant counterparts in Ulster, religious segregation was something that native
Boston Protestants encouraged and maintained when they were able. By enabling
residents of South Boston or Charlestown to move back into “their neighborhood,” with
“their own kind,” downtown Boston, which had historically been the domain of wealthy
Protestants, would be kept clear of the poor immigrant element.160 By improving the
already standing tenement houses in South Boston, the rest of the city could remain
separated between its different ethnicities and religions.
Despite the initial recommendation to improve those structures to achieve this,
however, in the spring of 1920, the initial report made by the RHC and CNL estimated
that in reality Boston required at least 3,000 to 4,000 new homes to solve the immediate
housing shortage and to alleviate overcrowding, but by the fall, Boston would need an

“Report 3300 Unoccupied Tenements”; and Front Matter, February 1920, House No. 1500, Report of
the Commission on the Necessaries of Life (Boston: Write and Potter Printing, 1920), 3, Google Books,
accessed 10 March 2018, https://books.google.com/books?id=n1pBAAAAYAAJ&dq=commission+
on+the+necessaries+of+life+history&source=gbs_navlinks_s.
160
“Concern Over Boston’s Drop,” Boston Post, 19 June 1920, p. 1, 3, Newspapers by Ancestry; and
O’Connor, South Boston, My Home Town, 127. O’Connor talks at length that the attitude of the native
Protestant population in Boston encouraged separation of the neighborhoods, i.e., Catholics and Protestants
should not intermingle.
159

58

additional 10,000 homes.161 The chairman of the RHC, Malcolm Nichols, who would
later serve as Boston’s last Republican mayor from 1926 to 1930, warned that the
situation would grow considerably worse by the fall if the city did not do something to
meet the needs of those citizens living in overcrowded areas.162 Although these various
committees had uncovered what other city officials said, “every wide-awake, sane,
intelligent man,” already knew, Mayor Peters did not make any definite move to address
the situation.163
Peters objected to state intervention on the grounds that the city would lose
money, but Councilman Henry Hagan countered that the city would never see great profit
if land taxes were never raised in downtown Boston, the wealthiest part of the city, while
in South Boston, one of the poorest parts of the city, land taxes were kept well above
what residents there had the means to pay.164 Council members accuse Peters of
“dillydallying” and ignoring the terrible health situation that poor housing created.165
Hagen went so far as to insinuate that Peters was no better than the “rent profiteers,”
those landlords “who can get any price they ask for apartments, no matter what the
condition of the apartments may be because people must be housed.”166 High rents would
ultimately be the crux of the issue as the 1920s wore on, but initially, Boston’s City
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Council did attempt to increase the number of homes in the city so that overcrowding
would not be so severe.
By the summer, the RHC and the CNL reported that statewide, an estimated
$365,000,000 was needed to start development, and that Boston would require at least
$20,000,000 to provide an estimated 4,500 homes.167 Boston’s City Council, knowing
that the city did not have the means fund such a large undertaking, came up with several
plans in order to raise the funds necessary to start construction. The first of these plans
turned out to be short-lived and hinted that the lack of housing development across the
city was due to more than just monetary concerns. In order to offset the predicted twenty
million needed to start building, the city proposed that “Boston bankers and business men
. . . create a building loan fund of generous proportions to build or assist in the erection of
homes by way of relieving the existing housing shortage.”168 Many banks promised that
they would “do all they could to make [a] housing corporation successful,” but stipulated
that in order to start loaning large sums of money to private contractors, the intended
purchaser of the house had to have at least a $1,000 deposit in the bank in order for work
to begin.169
At the beginning of 1920, the CNL had found that over eighty per cent of
Boston’s residents were tenants.170 For those who were already living in the dilapidated
areas like South Boston, coming up with such a large sum of money meant that they
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would have to accept a fifteen or even twenty-year mortgage in order to pay back their
debt.171 Although Peters was not unaware that other large cities with housing shortages
had overcome this issue by building “standardized houses,” and then either renting the
house until the occupant could buy it or selling the house to those who could afford it, he
did not pursue that option.172 When the City Council realized that it would take too long
to negotiate a deal with local banks to fund building projects, they turned to the state
constitution in the hopes that emergency laws could succeed in addressing the housing
shortage where cooperation between the city and banks had failed.173
During World War I, Article 47 had been amended to the Constitution of
Massachusetts, which gave the state the responsibility of “the maintenance and
distribution at reasonable rates, during time of war, public exigency, emergency or
distress, or a sufficient supply of food and other common necessaries of life and the
providing of shelter, are public functions, and the commonwealth and the cities and
towns therein may take and may provide the same for their inhabitants in such manner as
the general court shall determine.”174 Although this particular amendment referred
specifically to the needs of the city during wartime, some members of Boston’s City
Council believed that this article provided city officials the means to address the housing
shortage without having to go through the process of enacting new legislation which
would have taken months to obtain approval.175
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In August councilmen Hagan and Edward McLaughlin made a formal declaration
that “in the opinion of the members of the City Council a public exigency or emergency
or public distress exists because of an insufficient supply of shelter or available dwellings
in the City of Boston for its inhabitants; . . . his Honor the Mayor be hereby requested to
issue the proclamation provided for in chapter 554 of the Acts of 1920, and to take
immediate steps under the provisions of said act to relieve the present situation.”176 By
adding chapter 554 to Article 47, which was “an act to authorize cities and towns to
provide shelter for their inhabitants in case of emergency,” the city had the right to
declare eminent domain in areas where the housing need was critical.177 In practical
terms, this article and chapter combined allowed the city to borrow up to $15,000,000
outside the city’s debt limit.178 By utilizing Article 47, Boston’s lawmakers could bypass
the process of passing new legislation; put building in the hands of the city; and prevent
the investable rent increases in the fall.179
Despite the City Council’s defense of Article 47, Mayor Peters declined to act. He
told Hagan and the other members of the Council that this “particular legislative act . . .
was never intended to be applied to present conditions, but was only to be applied in the
case of a conflagration or something of a very serious nature in our community.”180 One
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of his advisors, Arthur Hill, told Peters that they did not believe high rent prices or a
shortage of dwellings warranted declaring a public emergency.181 Mayor Peters’ decision
not to take advantage of Article 47 caused widespread criticism––something Councilman
Hagan warned of––however, it did not seem to sway his final decision.182 McLaughlin
accused Hill and the other Republican legislature of deliberately working against
Boston’s city council to which Hill countered that the Democrats should work with State
Representatives to force through a bill that would bring about the desired change.183
Although all this might have been true, as time passed, Peters’ failure to act did prove to
be detrimental to Boston’s housing situation, particularly in the matter of high
rents.184
In an effort to appease the city council, in late October Mayor Peters conceded to
their demand that the RHC look into, for the second time in one year, the housing
situation in Boston, with particular emphasis on if rents were really as high as Hagan and
his fellow council members claimed.185 The evidence seemed to support the council’s
worries, as the commission reported that they had dealt with 3,800 rent complaints since
the spring and that it was currently dealing with nearly a 100 notices to vacate which
were deemed illegal on part of the landlord.186 In some cases, entire blocks of tenements
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received orders to vacate with little to no warning.187 Occupants either had to agree to
exorbitant rent increases or had to “double up” with other families who were willing to
accommodate them during the winter months.188 The mayor, unable to deny that rent
gouging was an ongoing problem, assured the people of Boston and his City Council that
the RHC––whose duty was to intercede on behalf of the tenants to stop evictions and
unfair rent increases––would do everything in its power “relieve oppressed tenants.”189
Boston’s citizens though did not seem to have a high opinion of the RHC, and
newspapers like the Boston Post accused “Mayor Peters’ rent and housing commission is
a pitiful joke. Its members are helpless because they have no sufficient authority, but
worse than they [sic] are certain Massachusetts judges who have proved themselves
blindly partial to the cause of the landlords.”190 This incident would set the tone of how
Boston’s city officials would continue to deal with the housing situation as the 1920s
progressed.
Boston was not exceptional in its discussion of rent increases in the 1920s, for it
was a discussion being held across the United States.191 What made Boston a unique case,
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was that similar to the situation in Derry, although there was a great demand for new
houses in both cities, their respective governments were not implementing any new
developments. In the view of those tenants who had to live in overcrowded and
unsanitary conditions in Boston, this was giving landlords the opportunity to raise rents
without any fear of reprisals because their tenant’s options of finding other means of
shelter were so limited.192 Although Boston had a law in place that clearly stated any rent
increase of more than 25 per cent in one year would be considered “presumptively unjust,
unreasonable and oppressive,” the CNL pointed out that there was “no penalty for
violation of this statue . . . therefore the burden and risk is upon the tenant.”193 This did
not seem to be an unfounded criticism, as the CNL learned that “the population of Boston
during the last decade [the 1920s] increased by 11.6 per cent [while] the number of
dwellings by but 10.8 per cent.”194 Boston’s rent prices were the highest recorded in the
state’s history and that “numbers of tenants have . . . surrendered to the demands of the
landlords,” owing to the fact that if he did not, “he will be served with a notice to
vacate.”195 Although a delay in building may not have been influenced by the
manipulation of political power as it was in Derry, it cannot be denied that the building
delay in Boston, particularly in immigrant-heavy areas, seemed to indicate that in the
1920s, certain levels of Boston’s ruling class did not seem to find the plight of the Irish of
great importance.
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One example of Peters’ administration’s unsympathetic attitude towards its
immigrant population was published in 1921. The Little Blue Book for Immigrants in
Boston was written with the intent to help not only those who were recent arrivals to
Boston but also to instruct those who were already part of the “American body politic,” to
become good citizens.196 In the chapter titled “Health,” the writers suggested that because
“the immigrant often lives in a crowded part of the city. . . . [where] the streets are narrow
the houses are old; the rooms are small; there is not much sunshine. The immigrant
should try to move into a better part of the city or to a town nearby, where there are wide
streets and new houses and little gardens.”197 The chapter listed measures for the
immigrant to take in order to keep hearth and home clean, yet did not state if the city was
responsible for aiding in the care of these “crowded parts of the city.” Nor did the writers
seem to consider if the immigrant had the financial means to move out of the tenement
areas. No doubt the mayor’s office viewed such an “aid” as a means of enlightening the
immigrant about the fact that he did not have to live in unsanitary or overcrowded
conditions. However, given that the mayor’s office had spent the better part of 1920
fighting with the City Council over the housing shortage, by this point these suggestions
only severed as a reminder of how inadequately the City of Boston was dealing with the
housing situation.
This changed somewhat by the mid-1920s, as building projects started to appear
with more frequency throughout the city. However, as needed as such projects were,
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placement of these new housing developments was telling in the government’s attitude of
Boston’s immigrant population. By 1925 the Boston Daily Globe reported that although
CNL had found that since 1924 “the construction of new dwelling progressed at a more
rapid rate than in any year since the war . . . however, [construction] has not materially
reduced rents, although it has mitigated the rental conditions of those able to pay high
rents. Those tenants able to pay medium rents have, as yet, received little or no relief by
lower rents.”198 The state appeared to only be addressing housing issues for those who
could afford them.
One such example was the construction of the Cleveland apartments in 1925,
situated on Beacon Street and Chestnut Hill Avenue, which was in the backyard of the
Back Bay, one of Boston’s older and wealthier neighborhoods.199 The Cleveland was “six
stories high and . . . contains 102 apartments consisting of two to five rooms.”200 These
“modern apartments,” also catered to greater convenience for the housekeeper, having
better-lighted kitchens for them to eat and work. A year later, Mayor Malcolm Nichols,
who had been the chairman of the CNL in 1920 and was Boston’s first and last
Republican mayor of the twentieth century, informed South Boston that construction of a
bathing house (a necessary establishment since so few homes had running water), was
being cancelled.201 This was due to the treasury being empty, thanks to the actions of the
previous mayor, and a high tax rate, which Malcolm insisted “citizens should not be
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obligated to pay for [such] luxuries.”202 Although this was not an unfair argument it did
seem to indicate that a level of indifference was present towards Boston’s immigrant
population on the part of the Protestant-dominated Republican Party.203
The construction of the Cleveland apartments was an improvement in the overall
need in Boston for new housing, but much like the fact that they were situated in one of
the more affluent areas, they also only catered to the upper-middle classes and the
wealthy. Rents remained high in the tenements areas, and the working and poorer classes
of the city remained at the mercy of private landlords. Since 1923 emergency rent laws
had been on Boston’s statute books, which stipulated that if a landlord planned to evict a
tenant they had to give them from two to six months warning so that said tenant would
have enough time to find other accommodations.204 They were supposed to end by 1924,
but in 1925, the CNL ward city officials “that if the emergency housing laws . . . ‘are
allowed to lapse this Spring, the old method used by unscrupulous speculators and
landlords of putting tenants out of their homes . . . in 48 hours will again become
prevalent.’”205 The CNL also reported:
It is impossible at present for these tenants to find lower-priced quarters.
When dwellings occupied by those able to pay a high rent were exploited
by speculators, it resulted in stimulating new building. . . . The situation of
the tenants with small incomes at present time is entirely different. High
wages and regular employment during the past several years enabled
tenants to meet high rental demands, but with smaller wages and part-time
employment, excessively high rents result in disaster to the family. When
this condition affects large groups, it greatly restricts the purchasing power
and prosperity of the community.206
“Repeal of $380,000 City Fund Asked,” Christian Science Monitor (Boston, Mass.), 12 January 1926, p.
5B, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.
203
O’Connor, South Boston, My Home Town, 104.
204
“Ask Emergency Rent Laws Be Continued,” Boston Daily Globe, 8 December 1923, p. 5, Boston Globe
Archive.
205
“Need Emergency Housing Laws,” Boston Daily Globe, 11 February 1925, p. A24, Boston Globe
Archive.
206
Ibid.
202

68

Although building developments might have eased the situation of housing in certain part
of Boston, the new construction was not having the effect of improving the condition the
lower classes.
By 1927 the CNL reported as much, stating that while there had been fewer
complaints about high rent prices across the city, “it is impossible under present high
construction costs to build new housing for families whose income allows them to pay
less than $35 a month for rent,” yet there was a great demand for accommodations at or
lower than $35 a month.207 The Commission outlined the number of homes which had
been built in 1926 (1,654) but made the point of stating that none of those houses were
affordable for the working classes.208 The Christian Science Monitor reported, “the
apartment situation in Boston . . . today is peculiar in that the higher-priced apartments
that were designed especially for people of wealth and refinement . . . are not proving
popular among [the working] class and are not nearly as much in demand as the cheaper
apartments.”209 For example, in South Boston, the CNL found that it “is populated mostly
entirely by wage earners of which the greater part consists of mechanics and laborers
whose income prohibits the payment of anything but a very moderate rental. The average
rental in South Boston is considerably lower than at the rate of $30 per month, many
being in the vicinity of $15.”210 The failure to cater the needs of the work classes had led

“Rent and Housing,” House No. 1100, February 1927, Report of the Commission on the Necessaries of
Life (Boston: Write and Potter Printing, 1920), 20, Hathi Trust, accessed 14 March 2018,
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b2996561?urlappend=%3Bseq=24.
208
Table, “New Dwellings Planned,” House No. 1100, February 1927, Report of the Commission on the
Necessaries of Life (Boston: Write and Potter Printing, 1920), 20, Hathi Trust, accessed 14 March 2018,
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b2996561?urlappend=%3Bseq=83.
209
“Lower Real Estate Market Offers Investment Change,” Christian Science Monitor (Boston, Mass.), 1
June 1927, p. 4B, ProQuest Historical Newspaper.
210
“Rent and Housing,” Report of the Commission on the Necessaries of Life, 88, accessed 14 March 2018,
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b2996561?urlappend=%3Bseq=92.
207

69

to a “surplus supply of high-rent property,” and had caused overcrowding to be a
persistent issue, with a population reaching a “suffocating density of 799 persons per
gross acre.”211
Although these housing issues may not have been unique to the city of Boston in
the 1920s, what proved Boston’s history of housing to be similar to the case of Derry was
that housing development, or the lack thereof, was often bound up in the decades-old
animosity between the Protestant financial district of the city and the Irish Catholic
political machines of the mayor’s office. From the turn of the twentieth-century Boston
was subjected to a tug of war between the Irish Catholic Democrats and the Yankee
Protestant Republicans, one that had, among other things, an adverse effect on housing.
One of the most notable ways in which Boston differed from Derry, is that its
Irish Catholic population, mostly through sheer weight of numbers, and because they did
not have the same voting restraints that were present in Northern Ireland, had been able to
elect one of their own to the position of mayor since the turn of the twentieth century.212
Although the Irish Catholics of Boston were able to secure more political representation
than their counterparts in Northern Ireland, the situation of the Boston Irish was still
dominated by a form of Protestant control in Boston’s financial district, situated in
Beacon Hill. Although the relationship between the Yankee businessmen and the Irish
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Catholic mayors had not been without its enmity prior to the 1920s, it was not until James
Michael Curley came to power (for the second time) in 1922 that tensions between the
two groups came to a head.213
Perhaps one of the more notable and infamous mayors of Boston, Curley was a
“rogue” and a “masterful salesman” who ran Boston as he saw fit.214 He did not care to
follow the rules and was unafraid of consequences. In 1903 himself and a friend
impersonated two Irish immigrants and took the Post Office civil service test in their
place to be letter carries in the city of Boston. They were found out and charged with
fraud, which they served sixty days jail time for. Curley’s only explanation was that he
“did it for a friend.”215 Although the Irish American community did not seem especially
troubled by Curley’s colorful career, his animosity with the Protestant financers of the
city ultimately proved more harmful in the long run for the Irish of Boston, as the
situation with housing would prove to demonstrate.216 From the time that the Irish had
arrived, the Protestant natives of Boston had regarded the Irish as “menaces to the city
and obvious threats to democratic institutions everywhere,” which men like Curley only
confirmed to be true during their times as mayor.217 Although the Yankee establishment
had long since lost control of the mayor’s office, they ensured a level of control over
Boston by implementing what was known as the Good Government Association (GGA).
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The GGA was founded 1903 by Yankee Republican businessmen who saw their
power come under threat with the election of John F. Fitzgerald to the office of mayor
(first in 1906 and again in 1910), who was not only an Irish Catholic but also the ward
boss of the North End.218 Although Boston’s ward boss system was not as strong or as
consolidated as the system run by the New York Irish, men like Fitzgerald still held
enough power and sway to secure the votes necessary to gain control of the city.219 Once
they brought their Democratic machine to City Hall, the Yankee establishment feared
they would run the city as they did their wards––excessive jobs, contracts, handouts, and
personal favors in exchange for loyalty.220 The GGA came together to ensure that either
only “good” Irishmen, ones that would be compliant with their wishes (low taxes, few
contracts, and honest administration) were voted into office, or better yet, one of their
own Republicans.221 If the GGA was forced to accept that the Irish would almost always
outvote a Republican candidate they wanted a Catholic Democrat in office who would
serve as representatives of their ethnic constituencies but not engage in “ethnic politics.”
Men who would run the city in an orderly and conservative manner, but who would
ultimately not pose a threat “of a large takeover by a permanent Irish political
apparatus.”222 Although even here, they were not always successful, as Henry Hagan,
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who had led the charge on the housing issues against Mayor Peters in 1920, had been
sponsored by the GGA, and still insisted on spending what money was needed to address
the housing shortage.223 However, once Fitzgerald institutionalized the Irish Democratic
machine in Boston’s local government, it proved difficult to fight against their support
base. As the 1930s neared, the animosity between the GGA and Irish Democrats dictated
how the city was maintained, which ultimately contributed to the housing shortage.
Despite the GGA’s best efforts to keep the Irish ward bosses out of the mayor’s
office, they had only marginal success. James Michael Curley had been voted in as the
city’s mayor in 1914, and when he decided to run for reelection in 1917, his main
competitor was the GGA’s candidate Andrew James Peters.224 Curley’s administration
from 1914 to 1917 had been rocked by financial scandal and excessive spending, causing
the downtown financiers to tighten their control on loans which they suspected would not
be used for their intended purpose. Such fears were not unjustified when, after Peters
defeated Curley, it came to light that he had mismanaged funds from Washington to
expand the “South Boston Cut,” a terminal planned to widen railway lanes in and out of
South Boston.225 Once Peters was in office, he was left to deal with Washington asking if
the 18 million dollars awarded for the job was being used for its intended purpose, and
why a Curley’s schoolhouse commissioner was awarded the contract for the job and not
Hugh Nawn Contracting Company, who was recommended to be awarded the contract
originally.226 Additionally, Curley possessed a house on Jamaicaway valued well above
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the means of a mayor’s income.227 Only two examples among many, Curley essentially
destroyed any semblance of trust or respect between Irish Catholics and Yankee
Protestants in Boston, which was reflected in the Yankee’s dealing with City Hall as the
years progressed.
The GGA, tired of Curley’s outrageous and questionable spending habits, and his
endless attacks of the Association wanted someone in the position of the mayor’s office
who would not institute large spending programs but would rather balance the budget and
not ask for more money. Andrew James Peters presented himself as an honest
candidate.228 The GGA hoped he would inspire voters in Boston to support impeccable,
obedient, candidates for the offices of city officials. Although Peters was a Yankee
Democratic, he came from a long line of Puritan ascendancy, had attended Harvard Law
School, and fit the GGA’s model of a moral and prudent leader.229 As Curley was Peters’
main opponent during the race, Peters played off the domination of Curley’s political
machine, claiming that he would run the city as a democracy as opposed to Curley’s
autocracy.230
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Although during and after his time as mayor, Curley claimed that all of his
financial schemes were only to the benefit of the people of Boston, in reality, when it
came to the issue of housing, he ultimately did more damage than good. Irish Americans
dismissed his excessive spending and under the table financial deals “as righteous
payback [to the Protestants] for decades of collective grief [on behalf of the Irish
community].”231 During his race against Peters, the leaders of major Irish American
Society in Boston (the Ancient Order to Hibernians, Irish National Foresters, and Irish
County Clubs) came out in support of Curley, urging their members to vote for him.232
However, it was not just that the Irish turned a blind eye to his corruption, it was that
Curley, in the traditional role of a ward boss, delivered on the two things his constituents
needed most: benefits and jobs.233 In his autobiography, I’ll Do It Again, Curley boosted
that when he became mayor in 1914 he “took people off welfare rolls and restored their
self-respect by providing them with jobs.”234 In 1922 Curley attended a game at Boston
College (founded specifically for “the sons of Irish immigrants”), and “when it was a
certainty that Boston was the victor Mayor Curley presented a gift of $100 to President
Riley of Sophomore with the wish that it be used in entertaining the team.”235 By
ensuring that “his” people had jobs and the occasional gift to ensure their continued
support, the Irish of Boston were able to turn a blind eye to his other antics. By having
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one of “their own” in a position of the mayor, the Irish were able to ensure that their
needs came first, something that the Yankee Republicans tended to neglect.
In the long run, however, the Irish community’s support of Curley only worked
against them. During his time as mayor, Peters had to prove himself more financially
thrifty then Curley, and housing in particular suffered because of Curley’s legacy. The
Republican Yankee bankers and private lenders were unwilling to spend more than was
needed in order to keep Boston from collapsing, and even then, little money was invested
in improving Boston’s infrastructure.236 When new housing developments did go up
during Peters’ time as mayor, as the CNL found, areas like South Boston, with its
overwhelming majority of Irish Catholics, were not designated for new building schemes,
and, perhaps more common, the new developments in other parts of the city were outside
the financial means of those in dire need of better living conditions.237
So despite Peters’ backing by the GGA, as a responsible leader who had Boston’s
best interests in mind, because of his inaction to address the housing crisis, it shouldn’t
have come as great surprise when Curley was voted back into the mayor’s office in 1922,
defeating the GGA candidate John Murphy, and then again in 1930, defeating GGA
indorsed candidate Frederick Mansfield, only to then become the Governor of
Massachusetts in 1934.238 Although Curley might have ensured that the Irish American
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community had the upper hand during his times as mayor, in doing so, he failed to see
that his actions hurt the very community he professed to represent. When he left city hall,
and either a Republican or a GGA sponsored Irish Democrat took his place, there was
little he could do to stop them from neglecting areas like South Boston and Roxbury as
payback for his actions.
This dynamic had especially dire consequences during the Great Depression. The
Depression left few places in American unaffected by unemployment, homelessness, and
hunger.239 Boston felt the Crash especially hard with its already shaky economy and its
combative financial situation. It developed its own Hooverville, foreclosures on
mortgages and high rents were rampant, and homelessness plagued certain parts of the
city.240 While these scenarios were repeated all over the nation and globe, with its record
of neglecting tenement buildings and failure to address the housing shortage, the
population in Boston was desperate for any solution which would elevate its destitution.
When Curley was elected as mayor for the third time in 1930, he “called for an ambitious
Fifty-Year Plan to develop industry, commerce, and municipal construction.”241
However, despite hiring men to pour concrete for a walkway to Castle Island, this only
offered temporary work in South Boston. Overall, he failed to initiate any programs that
stemmed the tide of mass unemployment.
Additionally, at a time when Boston could have used federal money to ease
everyday life, or even local loans to help with the crisis, Curley had burned too many
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bridges. He drained the City Treasury attempting to generate work in the city, which
forced him to blackmail the president of the First National Bank in Boston to get a loan
for his municipal projects, and even attempted to lower taxes in 1932.242 On the national
level as early as 1930 “some ten million dollars in federal money had been assigned to
Massachusetts for two hundred different road construction projections . . . but none of
those funds were earmarked for the city of Boston.”243 Federal welfare too became an
issue as it was “distributed only to places that meet the standards of aid set by the
Government.”244 Because of this, when President Roosevelt introduced his New Deal in
1933, many of the Irish in Boston were hopeful this would ease some of their
hardships.245
The New Deal addressed a number of issues facing the nation during the
Depression, and on the point of housing, it established the framework for what would
become the program of urban renewal in the 1950s. With the passing of the National
Housing Act in 1934, Washington officials started identifying those areas that were in
need of slum clearance and new construction.246 The National Housing Act was an
attempt on the part of the federal government to stem the tide of foreclosures across the
nation and “for the first time, the federal government was beginning to commit itself to
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the direct provision of housing for lower- and middle-income Americans.”247 The
National Housing Act marked a change in American political thought: public housing for
was now the responsibility of the federal government, which they hoped, would once and
for all ward off the blight of slums.248
Once the National Housing Act took effect, the Boston Housing Association,
founded in 1935, started to outline the areas that were in need of new construction so that
slum clearance could begin, and the city could start receiving federal money.249
Washington, weary of Boston’s continual sparring match between the Yankee
Republicans and the Irish Democrats, realized that they would have to be careful with the
amount of money lent to the city of Boston.250 However, since it was now in the federal
government’s interest to ensure that its population was better housed, federal authorities
instituted a public housing program in Boston to provide “housing for low-income
working families at rents they could afford.”251 Eventually, a site was selected in South
Boston and preparations began for the first federally funded housing project in New
England.252 The initial bid for the job was five million dollars, but given Boston’s history
with the improper use of federal money, particularly Curley’s track record, the
Government issued a strict warning that “the slightest indication of attempted
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exploitation would result immediately in scrapping the whole project.”253 The new
construction was intended to start in 1933, but due to “a complicated series of political
delays, real estate fights and bureaucratic postponements . . . it was another five years
before arrangements could be worked out.”254 The ground chosen for the site of what
would come to be called the Old Harbor Village, was a “19-acre tract, fronting on
Columbus Park, bounded by Old Harbor Avenue, Dorchester Street, Eighth Street and
Old Harbor Street,” and it was estimated to hold around 960 homes.255 Although South
Boston, in particular, was in desperate need of such housing developments, a report
published in the Christian Science Monitor pointed out one problem.
There was already a large tenement on the land, having been there for over half a
century, some residents having lived there for generations, and most of the rooms rented
for $5 to $10 a month. The new apartments to be built in their place would run anywhere
from $20 to $25, a price that even in good economic conditions would have been difficult
for the residents to afford.256 The commissions involved in planning the development
estimated that “about 1500 families would be affected by the housing plan [i.e.
displaced]. It is expected that only about one-half of these can be accommodated in the
new homes.” The land was obtained because of “low land costs,” and “for its nearness to
the beach, Columbus Park and its accessibility to the city proper.” The landlords who
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sold the land did not seem bothered by the fact that their tenants would lose their homes,
and the article concludes that “the problem of temporarily housing the residents while the
project is underway is not yet solved.”257 Slum clearance was a goal of the federal
government and these new houses were desperately needed, however, the fact that land
slated for redevelopment was already occupied was seldom taken into account by those
lending the money and building commissions.258 Although later the Old Harbor would be
praised as a success, for those who could afford them, this episode would lay the
groundwork for what would become a battle against urban renewal in the 1950s.
Despite this initial assessment of the desired land for the Old Harbor, it was not
until the Housing Act of 1937––also known as the Wagner Housing Act––passed that the
project actually began.259 By 1937 the number of homes estimated to be built in Old
Harbor had risen from 960 to 1016, yet 2300 applicants were waiting to hear if they
would have a home once building was completed.260 As building progressed efforts were
made to keep the final rental costs down so that the projects truly could be for “lowincome groups.” The Daily Boston Globe reported that “the buildings are to be of simple,
yet durable construction, with all unnecessary exterior details and unessential features
eliminated.”261 However, well before construction was complete, Frank Creadon, the
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district manager for the projects, was faced with charges that the walls of the Old Harbor
projects were “porous and leaking moisture into [the] rooms,” and that extra
waterproofing substances were being applied to the exterior walls.262 Creadon argued that
such measures were to prevent the buildup of white salt on the exterior brick because of
the project’s proximity to the ocean. Although there appears to be no follow up to the
issue that such problems were revealing themselves so early in the project’s development
did not bode well for their condition in the coming decades. Regardless, in May of 1938,
the projects finally opened. The only drawback to these projects was that they were too
expensive for “anyone on municipal welfare” to afford, which meant that of the 4,500
applicants waiting for a home, “at least half of these applicants will not be able to
qualify.”263 Perhaps in order to address this shortcoming, the following year the Boston
Housing Authority (BHA), the group in charge of development, announced that a second
housing project was planned for South Boston, this one soon to be dubbed the Old
Colony.264
The second development was planned to better accommodate those of lowincome and dependent on welfare. The rents would be “graded according to the income
of the tenant . . . for example, a three-room apartment may be obtained for $14, $17, or
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$21,” as opposed to the $25 for three rooms in Old Colony.265 Additionally, preferences
would be given to applicants who had formerly lived in the areas taken for the projects,
and to families having children under sixteen years of age. However, even as excitement
built in South Boston as “the old and dingy is coming down, and the new and lovely
about to go up,” again the issue of the state taking the needed land to construct these
housing projects through eminent domain displaced many of the residents of the
tenements which were demolished to make way for the Old Colony. There were several
lawsuits filed by those who were due to lose their home on the grounds that the BHA had
wrongly categorized their homes as substandard. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court ruled in favor of the BHA, claiming that they had the ultimate authority in deciding
what qualified as a substandard dwelling, which ultimately qualified it for demolition.266
These actions proved detrimental to South Boston’s relationship with Boston’s
lawmakers, one that would have larger ramifications once the issue of desegregating
South Boston’s high school was a center of conversations in the 1970s.
At the time these projects, particularly the Old Harbor projects, were “generally
considered one of the finest examples of Government housing projects because of the
wide variety of its accommodations and of its unsurpassed location in the South Boston
park and beach system.” However, future commentators would term them “unmitigated
disasters,” not only in terms of their racial segregation, as it became a heated topic after
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World War II, but also in terms of how they worked to further divide the city.267 The
housing developments of the 1930s brought both relief and new problems for the
residents of South Boston. One the one hand, subsidized housing was a much-needed
relief program during the Depression. On the other hand, in the act of acquiring the land
for said “relief” programs, many improvised residents of decades-old tenement houses
were displaced by the process of eminent domain. Additionally, they only worked to
reinforce the idea that certain neighborhoods belonged to certain ethnic groups, causing
Boston to become even more divided.268 Unfortunately, as the issue of housing became a
matter of concern both at the national and state levels again after World War II, those
problems would start to manifest themselves in rapid succession, hinting at what was to
come in the 1970s.
World War II postponed any further discussion of housing in Boston and only
gained attention again the 1950s. 269 However, even though the 1950s proved to be a
period of intense growth and development, particularly in the case of housing, one case of
urban renewal irrevocably damaged relations between the neighborhood of South Boston
and the city’s government. Although the act of displacing hundreds of residents when the
Old Colony and Old Harbor projects were built had been a shocking case of the city’s
government claiming eminent domain, in the 1950s with the distraction of the West End,
a predominantly Italian neighborhood, the residents of South Boston put a stop to any
further urban development in their neighborhood, fearing that if they allowed their own
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blight areas to be renovated, they too would be displaced from their traditional
communities, with nowhere to go.
In the late 1940s, Boston finally witnessed the downfall of James Michael Curley
and the rise of John B. Hynes. Hynes entered the civil service as a county clerk with little
ambition of becoming mayor of Boston.270 However, in 1947 he was asked to serve as
acting mayor while Curley served some jail time for mail fraud. When Curley returned
several months early when his sentence was commuted, rather than thanking Hynes for
taking care of the city for him and discussing what had happened in his absence, Curley
barricaded himself in his office and “during the next frantic few hours, he interviewed
sixty people, found jobs for every one of them, and made a series of decisions involving
millions of dollars for [public] contracts.” When he emerged he flippantly told some
reporters “I have accomplished more in one day then has been done in the five months of
my absence.”271 Although a seemingly harmless comment, Hynes viewed this as a slight
against his capabilities of seeing to the city’s needs. Furious, he declared that he would
run for mayor in the next city election, which in 1949, he won by a comfortable majority,
effectively marking the end of an era “and the beginning of another.”272
Hynes’s election to the office of the mayor marked a shift not only in the political
life of Boston’s residents but also in the relationship between the Irish Democrats and the
Yankee Protestants. When Hynes came to office, some feared he would fall in line with
Boston’s previous Irish Catholic mayors, owing to the fact that he was “the product of
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Irish Catholic neighborhoods, he was a career bureaucrat, [and] he had received his job as
chief clerk from James Michael Curley.”273 However, as time went on, Yankee
Protestants, still largely in control of Boston’s finances in the 1950s, realized that when
Hynes “did not try to rekindle only ethnic antagonism; he avoided setting the needs of the
outlying neighborhoods against the interest of the central city; and he refused to employ
the old divisive political tactics of pitting Catholics against Protestants,” their fears were
eased and gradually agreed to give him the financial backing for municipal projects they
had so long denied Curley. Although this would later cause accusations from the Irish
community that he was “‘in the pocket’ of the downtown bankers,” much as were the
GGA Irish Democrats of the 1930s, Hynes worked to mend the relationship with the
Republicans, so much so that he was largely successful in his mission to revitalized the
city he referred to as “old Dame Boston.”274 In fact, Hynes was so successful at this
balancing act that he remained in the mayor’s office until 1960, serving for an impressive
ten years.
Throughout Hynes’s tenure, Boston saw massive building projects expand across
the city, including extensive housing developments.275 Boston’s new responsible mayor
was partly to thank for this, but these projects were also helped when Congress passed the
Title I of the Housing Act in 1949, which appropriated “$500 million to aid cities in
undertaking urban development projects,” because “the general welfare and security of
the Nation and the health and living standards of its people require housing production
and related community development sufficient to remedy the serious housing shortage,
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the elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing through the clearance of
slums and blighted areas.”276 Aided by this Act, the BHA started to select those areas
across the city which it deemed to be the most seriously blighted areas.277 In theory, this
program of relief should have finally addressed the housing shortage and substandard
living conditions that Boston had been dealing with since 1920. Sadly though, much like
the episode of the BHA’s slum clearance plan for South Boston in the 1930s, this new
housing act would prove to be detrimental for the relationship between Boston lawmakers
and her ethnic citizens.
By 1953 slum clearance was taking over the city in a way never seen before.
Although this was a great improvement to the years of inaction, it still came with
consequences which, considering what had happened in the 1930s, the city should have
been able to better accommodate for. The Christian Science Monitor reported that fifteen
million in federal aid had been slotted for Boston’s urban development plan and that the
BHA had designated the South End, West End, and Mattapan districts for slum clearance
and redevelopment. However, the article also stated that at least 600 people would be
displaced by the “razing of the substandard South End structures.”278 The residents of the
South End loudly denounced this plan and told the BHA that they would be “unable to
find suitable homes elsewhere within their rental budget.”279 However, the BHA was
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confident that they could “easily be accommodated in a few months by normal vacancies
in BHA public housing units in other parts of the city.”280 Much like the episode of South
Boston in the 1930s, there was a lawsuit filed on the behalf of the citizens, but by 1956
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld that the BHA had the authority to take
and redevelop the land under the Housing Act of 1949.281 The bulldozers eventually
came, but the land “lay fallow for a decade,” never being utilized for its intended purpose
of building new housing developments.282 Although this would be a devastating
consequence of the urban renewal program of the 1950s, it paled in comparison to the
fate of one of Boston’s oldest neighborhoods, the West End.283
What made the destruction of the West End so devastating, “and nearly stopped
neighborhood renewal in its tracks with permanent damage to Hynes’s legacy,” was its
sheer volume.284 The BHA had chosen this neighborhood for a slum clearance plan
because the neighborhood had become a place the city viewed as outdated, improvised,
overcrowded, and a dangerous slum area with its “narrow ‘European streets,’” which
could harbor any number of unwelcome things, that should be “wiped out as soon as
possible.”285 When the twenty million bid was submitted for approval of the project in
1953, the Daily Boston Globe reported that 682 houses would be demolished to “make
way for over 2000 families.”286 The project was slated to start in 1954, and in order to
elevate fears that the those displaced would not have anywhere to go once the city seized
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their property, the BHA published a pamphlet which assured the citizens of the West End
that when the time came, “decent, safe and sanitary dwelling unit within their means to
pay” were guaranteed, and that “families displaced by the West End project will be given
top priority to get into public housing.”287 Mayor Hynes said that it was even possible
that the job would not be approved and that no one would lose their home. Given the
cities track record on housing developments, this was not to be the case.
When the approval came through in 1957 to begin development, the city proved
to be more eager to begin development than following through on its promise of not
displacing the residents of the West End.288 Because the project had taken so long to
receive approval “financial investment took precedence over community resettlement,
references to the availability of public housing became fewer in number and less explicit
in description. By the time the tenants finally received their official eviction notices in the
spring of 1958, there was no mention at all of low-rent public housing.”289 The estimated
number of those who would lose their homes to make way for “high-rise luxury
apartments, modern shopping centers, [and] massive garages,” was 2700 families.290 The
majority of those displaced were poor, Italian immigrants, and refugees.291 Unlike in past
episodes of displaced tenants, lawsuits were not filed and in December of 1959, the Daily
Boston Globe ran an editorial which cheerfully informed its readers “if the West End can
be switched from dilapidation to delight as was New York’s East Side, it may be the trail-
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blazing spark which could revitalize Boston.”292 This action, above all others, caused
deep reverberations throughout Boston’s other ethnic neighborhoods, which would
ultimately cause the other neighborhoods to reject the very thing that they needed
most.293 They had decided the cost was too high to pay.294
The destruction of the West End put a halt to any and all further developments in
Boston’s outlying ethnic neighborhoods. After the West End had been so ruthlessly
demolished, it “damaged race relations and revived dormant class and enmity in the old
Irish neighborhoods of Charleston and South Boston. The Yankee overlords were
replaced by bow-tied urban planners who pored over maps without seeing any of the
people.”295 This would be echoed during the lead up to the Busing Crisis, as city
councilman Lawrence DiCara noted, “two professors from Boston University with no
connection to Boston, came up with a busing plan which pitted the poorest White
neighborhoods against the poorest black neighborhoods.”296 In South Boston in the years
just before the busing order was handed down, the residents organized themselves to
prevent any “‘outsider interests’ coming into the peninsula district and transform a
peaceful family community into an area of high-rise apartments and expensive
condominiums.”297 In 1972 the BHA had planned to demolish six of South Boston’s
schools, repave the roads, and rezone the area to allow for more industry, but “the united
resistance of angry South Boston residents, who feared that these ambitious plans would
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destroy the family character of their community and displace the old-time residents as
they had seen happen in the West End, stopped [those] plans cold.”298 After the
destruction of the West End, and during its own experiences with the Old Colony and Old
Harbor, South Boston had had enough.
Owing to the fact that the local government had never tried to ease relations
between the Irish Catholics and the lawmakers on the Hill, the residents of South Boston
ultimately considered housing to be a means by which old, ethnic neighborhoods were
destroyed rather than updated. So, unlike their counterparts in Derry, the Irish of South
Boston did not allow outside interference to disrupt their community, and as a
consequence, South Boston did not receive the housing developments it so desperately
needed. Once the busing order was handed down, and the residents of South Boston
realize that this was not something they could prevent, the neighborhood “blew up.”299
DiCara, although not from South Boston, had grown up in the equally Irish neighborhood
in Dorchester. He said that for the residents of South Boston, the busing order
“represented the final indignity,” and this was one of the reasons the neighborhood’s
reaction to busing was so immediate and violent.300 Decades of neglect coupled with the
ruthless demolition of ethnic neighborhoods did not work to assure the citizens of South
Boston that their government respected their concerns or needs. Even John Hynes who
came from an Irish neighborhood did not seem especially troubled by the mass evictions
and displaced peoples who bore their lot all in the name of progress. Housing in Boston,
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rather than alleviating the animosity between the Irish Catholic and Yankee Protestant,
only severed to further divide the communities.
***
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Conclusion
Derry, Northern Ireland and South Boston, Massachusetts are separated by 3,000
miles of ocean, yet the histories of these two small towns mirror one another, until the
1970s. Irish Catholics in Derry marched in 1968 in order to demand they be granted the
same civil liberties as their Protestant neighbors. Irish American Catholics in South
Boston marched in the streets in order to show their displeasure at the government’s
decision to desegregate South Boston High. Although on opposite sides of the civil rights
issue, both movements would lead to years of civil unrest and extreme episodes of
violence. Neither movement would ultimately prove to be a success. Although the Good
Friday Agreement finally brought the Troubles to an end, that agreement was not
achieved about without assistance from the United States and several years of
negotiations with the British government. Organizations like the Derry Housing Action
Committee failed to win civil rights for the people of Northern Ireland. Rather they
unleashed several decades’ worth of pent-up frustration which ultimately threw the North
into thirty years of brutal conflict.
In South Boston, the marchers who demanded that the busing order be rescinded
earned South Boston the title of “the Little Rock of the North.”301 Although the residents
themselves would later argue that they were not racists, but rather argued that they were
not given a choice in the decision, the greater United States refused to listen to their
explanations for their reaction. By 1976, when it became obvious that their protests were
falling on deaf ears, those who could afford it moved to the suburbs. For those who could
not, they either gave up their protests and sent their child to the few private Catholic
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schools in South Boston or turned a blind eye to their child’s perpetual absence from
school. Neither option addressed their qualms about the busing order, but only served to
further divide the Irish American community not only from state lawmakers but also
from the African American community. However, although these two communities took
radically different paths in the 1970s, the years leading up to those events reveal that
these cities had, until that time, had very similar experiences. By comparing these cities’
histories of housing, this thesis has examined one of those similarities and revealed that
many of the same issues which were present in Derry were also present in South Boston,
the first and foremost being the antagonistic relationship between the Protestant and
Catholics.
Both were founded by Protestants who had no love for those of the Catholic
denomination and were defined by their religious and ethnic segregation. They both faced
severe housing shortages that their respective governments did not address. Either by
design or due to insufficient funds to pursue large development plans, there is no denying
that such actions fostered resentment in both Irish Catholic communities. By raising these
similarities, it will now enable further research into why these two communities took
such drastically different turns in their history once their various movements began. By
doing so it might be possible to offer a broader examination of the Irish experience in the
latter half of the twentieth century.
There is no denying that Irish Catholics in South Boston made a questionable
decision to protest busing in the way that they did. It is not possible to examine the
history of the Busing Crisis without acknowledging that racism did have a part to play in
the backlash Massachusetts witnessed in the fall of 1974. However, that is not the whole
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story. South Boston did have a unique history, one that has been well documented, but
there is currently little discussion on the backdrop of South Boston’s history leading up to
1974 which examines the problems facing the neighborhood when the busing order was
finalized. This thesis has shown that housing did ultimately contribute to the disquiet of
the neighborhood in terms of being distrustful of those in positions of power. By doing
this, this thesis has demonstrated how housing played an integral part in creating a cycle
of animosity between Irish Catholics and Yankee Protestants.
In the case of Derry, the history of its housing has only been placed at the introductions
of the many histories of the Troubles. There has been little discussion on housing in the
early twentieth century, which has had the unfortunate consequence of portraying the
housing as being an issue that only gained prominence in the 1950s. By showing that, in
fact, housing was a problem facing Derry community as early as 1920, it becomes easier
to understand Catholics were so irate with the Unionist Party’s manipulation of political
representation by controlling housing. Starting in Derry enabled this comparison to link
the experiences of Irish Americans back to their native land, and showed that, in the area
of housing, Irish Catholics in the North of Ireland were not alone in their predicament.
Although this examination of how housing shaped the political ideology of both
cities has revealed a great deal, it is but one chapter in a much larger story. In issues such
as the economy, unemployment, identity, family, society, culture, and after the
movements began, the defense of the neighborhoods, are still in need of an in-depth
analysis. Additionally, these cities early histories, particularly during the Famine, the late
nineteenth century, and the turn of the century, would also shed light on how these eras
shaped these communities. The next phase of this research project will be to expand and
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refine the history of housing, especially an examination of how citizens in these
communities were reacting to, and if at all, attempting to influence change via any
grassroots movements. This is where archival research will be an asset to this continued
analysis and shed light on the voices of the people themselves who lived through this
time period.
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